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THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIMENTALLY INTRODUCED ANCHORAGES 
UPON JUDGMENTS IN THE AUTOKINETIC SITUATION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the present study is to investigate 
some social factors which appear to be important in deter­
mining simple judgmental reactions in an unstructured 
stimulus situation. Specifically it is concerned with the 
effectiveness of various experimentally introduced anchor­
ages in inducing shifts in judgment as a function of the 
distance or discrepancy between the established scale of 
judgment of the subject (^ ) and the introduced anchorage. 
Extensive pretest data have indicated the possibility that 
the effectiveness of the introduced anchorage diminishes 
with a considerable increase in distance from the scale of 
judgment established by the If the effect can be experi­
mentally demonstrated, it is believed that this study will 
have definite implications for the psychology of attitude
1
change, although the present experiment is not a study of 
attitude change per se.
Conditions in Which Social Factors 
Influence Judgment
An important issue in studies of the influence of 
social factors on judgment concerns the conditions under 
which the spoken judgments of another person or persons 
modify judgments of a Of particular interest has been 
the role of social pressures or majority opinion in influ­
encing judgments both in highly structured and in ambiguous, 
ill-defined situations.
Relative Effectiveness of Social Factors in 
Situations of Varying Stimulus Structure
Several experiments by Coffin (4) are important be­
cause they provide evidence that verbal anchorages are more 
likely to be accepted when the stimulus situation is ambigu­
ous than when the stimulus being judged is relatively well- 
structured. Coffin was interested in the influence of 
suggestion upon ^s* responses in situations of varying ambi­
guity. His experiments on tonal attributes were designed to 
utilize a situation similar to those commonly employed in 
experiments on suggestion, and to test "not only whether it
3is possible Co produce suggestion but whether certain con­
ditions of the scimuli are more conducive to suggestion than 
are others" (4, p. 85).
Tone was selected as a stimulus whose attributes 
might be said to vary in ambiguity. Coffin believed that 
the most frequently recognized attributes of tone are loud­
ness and pitch, and that there exists sufficient agreement 
as to when a tone is louder or is higher in pitch to enable 
one to consider these attributes relatively unambiguous.
Tone however also has other attributes, such as volume and 
density. To naive Ss however, these attributes are likely 
to seem less clear and certain. Coffin noted that observers 
judging these attributes commonly require "training" to 
return consistent judgments, which may indicate that they 
are somewhat more ambiguous as stimuli than are pitch and 
loudness.
In his experiment Coffin chose one of the unambigu­
ous attributes— pitch, and one of the ambiguous attributes-- 
volume, and designed an experiment to measure changes in 
judgment of these attributes under the influence of sugges­
tion. In addition to the investigation of pitch and volume, 
a third attribute was introduced in the experiment. To pro­
vide a situation of still greater ambiguity, a quite novel
4attribute was ''invented.” This "new” attribute was arbi­
trarily defined as varying (with frequency and intensity) in 
the opposite manner to volume, increasing with pitch and de­
creasing with loudness. The newly defined attribute was 
given the impressive name "Orthosonority.” Since the S^s 
could not have heard of "orthosonority,” it seemed reason­
able, according to Coffin, to suppose that this new attribute 
represented a more ambiguous, unstructured situation than 
did either volume or pitch.
Each ^ was presented with a tonal stimulus for judg­
ment, an "incorrect" suggestion was introduced, and the 
conformity of his response to the suggestion was measured.
The purpose of the experiment was to compare the relative 
susceptibility to suggestion of judgments on pitch, volume, 
and "orthosonority."
The ^ was presented first with a standard tone of a 
given pitch, volume, and loudness, and then with a second or 
comparison tone which differed from the standard in some 
respect. By manipulation of a dial which the ^ controlled, 
the second tone could be changed until it seemed to be equal 
to the standard tone in respect to the attribute being 
studied in that trial.
Since this was an experiment in suggestion, a few
5"stage properties" were employed, with the idea of impressing 
the ^s with the profoundly scientific character of the whole 
undertaking. These "properties" the author hoped would 
"have the effect of endowing the suggestions about to be pre­
sented with the revered, slightly mysterious, and indubitably 
truthful atmosphere of science" (p. 87). The experimental 
room was well stacked with scientific-appearing devices, all 
manner of irrelevant electrical apparatus, and brass 
instruments.
The suggestion was presented in the form of a baké­
lite faceplate attached to the ^'s dial, reading, "Increase 
Pitch (Volume, Orthosonority)" and a prominent arrow indicat­
ing the direction in which to turn the dial to follow the 
suggestion. No further suggestions were given than this 
silent suggestion of the label and arrow.
With Ss judging pitch (the unambiguous stimulus) it 
was found that the suggestion was not very effective in 
shifting their judgments in the "incorrect" or suggested 
direction. The author points out that S^s failed to comply 
to any great extent with the suggestion. The results of the 
experimental and control groups for volume (the ambiguous 
stimulus) indicate that the control group varied intensity 
in the "correct" direction while members of the experimental
group were significantly influenced by the "suggestion” on 
their dial. The author notes that "this result indicates 
response to the suggestion rather than to the actual require­
ments of the situation" (p. 98). The results, then, indicate 
the judgments of the relatively ambiguous attribute tonal 
volume are more subject to suggestion than are judgments of 
the more definite attribute pitch.
To carry the extent of ambiguity of stimuli further, 
the "invented" attribute "orthosonority" was employed. The 
only description of "orthosonority" given to the Ss was that 
it "increases with pitch and decreases with intensity" (p.
99). Whereas the attributes volume and pitch were carefully 
described before the Ss began their judgments, no further 
description whatsoever was given of "orthosonority." The 
author noted that "repeated questionings on the part of the 
Ss revealed that they were quite at a loss as to how to con­
ceptualize the attribute" (p. 99).
The suggestion given to in the "orthosonority" 
experiment was toward a decrease in intensity. The results 
indicated that no ^ departed from the "suggested" direction. 
Coffin concluded that "it would appear that can be in­
duced to judge a totally unfamiliar attribute of tones and 
that the direction of their judgments may be influenced by
suggestion In either direction" (p. 101).
The results of Coffin's experiments demonstrate that 
Ss' judgments are more likely to be Influenced by "sugges­
tion" when the stimulus being judged Is ambiguous than when 
It Is unambiguous. A series of experiments by Luchins (10) 
has demonstrated very similar results.
Luchins (10) was interested in determining whether 
it is possible to obtain extremes of influence, i.e. 100 per 
cent agreement and 100 per cent disagreement, by slight 
variations of the same experimental set-up. The material to 
be judged in these experiments consisted of a series of five 
drawings, each of which was on a grey card two inches by 
three inches in size. On each card was a small square from 
which two lines of unequal length projected in different 
directions. On every card one of the lines was one inch in 
length. On card 1 the remaining line was 15/16 of an inch, 
on card 2 the line was 14/16, and on each of the succeeding 
cards the line decreased by 2/16 of an inch so that the line 
was 1/2 of an inch on card 5.
In all experiments the S was given the task of 
selecting the shorter of two lines on each of the five cards. 
Prior to judging each pair of lines, the ^ heard another 
individual make a selection. The other person was made to
8appear like a naive ^ although actually he was cooperating 
with the experimenter.
In one experiment the "plant,” or experimenter's 
confederate, made correct choices, i.e. he designated the 
objectively shorter line as the shorter, and all but a few 
Ss agreed with his judgments. In another experiment the 
"plant’s" judgments were always incorrect, i.e. the objec­
tively longer line was designated as the shorter, and it was 
found that the majority of the ^s disagreed with him.
Following these initial experiments, variations were 
carried out with the object of producing zero and 100 per 
cent agreement with the "plant" by employing two different 
methods. One of these methods Luchins refers to as the em­
ployment of "external means." In one experiment the employ­
ment of "external means" consisted of adding the experi­
menter's appraisal of "right" to the "plant's" answers, and 
in another of adding "wrong" to the judgments of the which 
disagreed with those of the "plant." In another variation 
Ss were given special training prior to the experiment to 
develop what Luchins refers to as "following behavior." And 
in still another variation, a direct challenge was made to 
the S to get 100 per cent agreement with the "plant." The 
other method used to obtain 100 per cent or zero per cent
agreement with the "plant” consisted of providing means for 
clarifying the evidence presented for judgment, i.e. making 
the stimulus cards so that the lines were parallel and thus 
easier to judge, furnishing a means for measuring the lines, 
and clarifying the possibility of being misled.
The results of these experiments indicate that when 
the "plant's" judgments were correct, i.e. the objectively 
shorter line was designated by the "plant" as shorter, 100 
per cent agreement was readily achieved. And when the 
"plant's" judgments were incorrect, zero per cent agreement 
was obtained. The author was interested, however, in find­
ing out if it was possible to produce 100 per cent agreement 
with the "plant" when his judgments were in fact incorrect. 
It was found that large increases in this direction could be 
obtained under some circumstances, but that 100 per cent 
agreement was not reached. Luchins observed that "it seemed 
more difficult to secure agreement when the confederate's 
choices were false" (10, p. 109). He noted that most £s 
appeared to be guided by the lengths of the lines and that 
it was not easy to overcome this tendency. Luchins con­
cluded that whether or not the Ss were influenced by the 
"plant's" judgments seemed to depend on the obviousness of 
the correct answer, i.e. the clarity of the judgment
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situation, on the truth or falsity of the "plant’s” judg­
ments, and also on the ^s' attitudes to and interpretations 
of their task and the experimental situation. Additional 
experiments by Luchins (12, 13, 14) along the same lines have 
reported similar findings.
In another experiment Luchins (11) varied the mater­
ial offered for judgment. In this experiment the investi­
gator was interested in the following questions: If after
hearing someone else describe a drawing, an individual is 
asked to examine and describe it, will the previously heard 
response influence what he sees? Will this influence take 
the direction of focusing the individual on seeing what the 
other person described? Will it perhaps cause him to over­
look certain prominent structural features of the drawing? 
Will the influence differ for designs of various degrees of 
structural clarity?
The author states that "from some of the laws of 
perceptual organization, we may expect that ^ s will tend to 
view an ambiguous design, which does not dictate an appro­
priate response, in accordance with what the other person 
said it contained, that the overheard description will serve 
as a frame of reference from which to view the unclear 
situation; but that in a well-structured drawing, the
Il
Individual'a perception will be determined not by che other's 
response, but by the characteristics of the design itself"
(11, p. 257).
Twelve drawings were used in the experiment and were 
presented in an order which constituted a series. The series 
began with a very ambiguous, unclear design out of which the 
contours of a bottle gradually emerged in successive cards 
until on the last card there was a complete and clear picture 
of a bottle.
The series of 12 drawings was presented to a number 
of children, and their reactions to each drawing were re­
corded. This constituted a control experiment. Following 
this the same drawings were presented to a number of pairs 
of children. One child of each pair, in accordance with 
previous instructions, always responded first and said, "I 
see a face." The reaction of this instructed ^ (the "plant") 
appeared to exert an influence on the description given by 
the naive member of each pair. The naive ^s gave more 
responses of face and fewer responses of "bottle" than had 
the control group Ss. It was found that the influence was 
even stronger (i.e. more replies of face, fewer replies of 
bottle) when the 12 drawings were preceded by an introductory 
series in which the profile of a face gradually disintegrated.
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and the "plant” answered "face” to every drawing both in the 
preliminary and test series. Luchins observed that the use 
of the introductory cards alone, without the "plant” appeared 
to have little or no effect. However, results similar to 
those obtained by the use of the "plant” were secured by 
using other introductory cards, certain kinds of previous 
experience, or altered instructions.
According to Luchins, with the exception of a few ^s, 
the social influence was not in the nature of a blind re­
iteration of what the "plant" had reported. The examined 
the drawings and looked for the object reported by the 
"plant.” When a characteristic of the design compatible 
with the "plant's" statement was found, it became for some 
£s the only aspect of the design to which they paid attention. 
Luchins concluded that "both external conditions (the nature 
of the drawing) and internal conditions (attitudes of the ^s) 
were relevant in bringing about the results" (11, p. 272).
The influence of the "plant” differed for designs of 
various degrees of structural clarity. In a drawing which 
contained a clearly structured object, ^s tended to describe 
this object regardless of what the "plant” said. And even 
in the more ambiguous and complex drawings, ambiguity or 
unclearness was no guarantee that the ^s would agree with
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the "plant." When a drawing did not readily lend itself to 
organizations or alterations compatible with the "plant's" 
reaction, the children usually reacted to some character­
istic of the design itself. Thus it would seem that whether 
or not a ^ agreed with the "plant" depended to an extent on 
whether the objective material gave the possibility of sup­
port of the "plant's" description.
A similar series of experiments was carried out by 
Asch (1, 2) with the object of investigating some conditions 
that influence individuals to remain independent or to yield 
to group pressures when these are contrary to fact. In this 
connection, Asch has observed that "current thinking has 
stressed the power of social conditions to induce psychologi­
cal changes arbitrarily. It has taken slavish submission to 
group forces as a general fact and has neglected or implic­
itly denied the capacities of men for independence, for 
rising under certain conditions above group passion and 
prejudice" (2, p. 68). Thus in this series of studies, the 
interaction between individuals is observed where the most 
important issue is that of remaining independent or of sub­
mitting to social pressure.
In the first experiment of the series, a disagreement 
was produced between a majority and one individual about a
14
clear and simple issue of fact. The majority, which was in 
all cases unanimous, cooperated with the experimenter by re­
porting wrong judgments, in disagreement with the £ who could 
only judge the facts on the basis of the stimuli presented. 
The task in this case, required the comparison of the rela­
tive length of lines, ^s were required to match a standard 
line with one of three comparison lines which differed 
appreciably in length from one another, and one of which was 
equal to the standard. The unanimous majority matched the 
standard with a length that differed from it in almost every 
case.
The results indicated that "the minority estimates 
remained preponderantly accurate, testifying to the force of 
the perceived relations under the given conditions" (2, p. 
69). Thus although one-third of the ^s' estimates in this 
study were distorted toward the estimates of the majority, 
and virtually all of the ^s were disturbed by the majority 
contradiction of their judgments, two-thirds of the judg­
ments were determined correctly on the basis of the stimuli 
presented. However, Asch did find individual differences 
among his ^s with performances ranging from complete acquies­
cence to complete independence.
Variations of the above experimental conditions were
15
carried out in which the quality of group opposition and the 
quality of the task were systematically altered. In one case, 
the effect of increasing the contradiction between the S and 
the majority was investigated. In another experiment, the 
size of the majority was varied. A partner supporting the 
naive ^ was introduced in a third variation, and the effects 
of a naive majority vs. an instructed minority of one were 
studied in a fourth experiment.
Of particular relevance to the present study was a 
variation in which it was demonstrated that the results of 
the first study could be attributed in part to the particular 
stimulus material used. When differences between the lines 
did not provide an objective basis for discrimination, the 
were influenced significantly by the judgments of the 
"planted" majority without reporting that they felt upset or 
disturbed. In other words, as the stimulus material became 
more ambiguous, it was demonstrated that group pressures 
became more important in the determination of judgment.
The experiments mentioned above as well as one by 
Thrasher (22) have conclusively demonstrated that social 
factors play a significantly greater role in determining 
judgment when the stimulus material is ambiguous and poorly 
defined than when the stimulus is well-structured and
16
meaningful. But while individuals may not "slavishly submit" 
to social pressures when the stimulus being judged is non- 
ambiguous, the question still remains concerning the limits 
of influence of these social factors in ambiguous and ill- 
defined situations. Very little is known about the limits of 
social influences in highly ambiguous situations or the 
variables which might define such limits. The possibility 
exists that even in uncertain and poorly defined situations 
there are limits to the influence of social factors such as 
those mentioned in the preceding studies.
Effectiveness of Social Factors in Situations Involving 
Ambiguous or Unstructured Stimulus Material
One of the first investigations of the influence of 
social factors on perception and judgment, utilizing ambigu­
ous stimulus material, was carried out by Sherif (17) in 
1935. In this experiment ^s serving in the control group 
made judgments of autokinetic movement in repeated sessions 
in which they served alone. With these ^s it was found that 
once a stable individual norm was established in the first 
session, there was a tendency for the ^ to maintain the same 
norm in subsequent sessions. These observations were sub­
sequently confirmed by Walter (25).
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In the experimental groups ^s' estimates of movement 
in the autokinetic situation were compared when they were 
alone and when two or three ^s were brought together. In 
one part of this experiment, each ^ served in an initial 
session alone and was then introduced into a group session. 
The purpose of this procedure was to investigate the influ­
ence of interaction with other individuals after the ^ had 
had the opportunity to form a stable individual norm of 
judgment in the "alone" situation.
In the second part of the experiment, were intro­
duced to the situation along with other individuals partici­
pating for the first time. Following this, each ^  served 
alone in the situation. The purpose of the second procedure 
was to find out whether any standard which might be estab­
lished jointly with other individuals would continue to 
determine the ^'s reaction in the "alone" situation.
The results of the experiment indicated that when 
two or three £s served together in the situation, they 
tended to converge in their judgments and develop a common 
range and norm. This result was observed regardless of 
whether the individuals participating were facing the situ­
ation for the first time or whether they had served in a 
previous session alone and had had the opportunity to
18
develop an individual norm and range of judgment independ­
ently. However, as Sherif has pointed out, "this convergence 
is not so close as that which occurs when the ^s first work 
together and have less opportunity to set up stable individ­
ual norms" (18, p. 171). Apparently when the individual has 
previously established a norm and range of judgment inde­
pendently, he is less susceptible to the influence of social 
factors than when he is facing the situation for the first 
time.
An experiment by Kelman (8) indicates another factor 
which may determine the individual's susceptibility to social 
influences in the autokinetic situation. The experimenter 
in this case informed some ^ s serving alone that their judg­
ments were "correct." When these ^ s were later placed in a 
group situation with other individuals whose judgments dif­
fered from their own, there was a marked lack of convergence 
in their judgments. In some of the ^s there was even a tend­
ency to diverge in the opposite direction under some circum­
stances.
These experiments by Sherif and Kelman suggest that 
even in an extremely ambiguous judgment situation there are 
limits in the extent to which social factors may modify judg­
ment. Although there are no studies which have systematically
19
investigated the limits of social influences in the auto­
kinetic situation, two experiments in the literature provide 
valuable leads.
In one investigation, Sperling (21) repeated Sherif's 
main experiment and confirmed the findings, ^s serving 
alone quickly established a constant level of judgment and 
tended to maintain the same norm of judgment in subsequent 
sessions. Similarly, when two individuals were brought to­
gether in the situation, their judgments quickly converged 
and they adopted the same norm of judgment often fluctuating 
jointly away from their earlier level. However, when the 
experimental conditions were varied, the convergence effect 
was disturbed. With one group of Ss, a "plant” was intro­
duced into the situation, who distributed her judgments be­
tween 20 and 25 inches— a range which exceeds the estimates 
normally obtained under the given experimental conditions.
In this case, although eight of the nine ^s shifted signifi­
cantly in the direction of the "suggested" extent of move­
ment, the amount of convergence was limited. In no case did 
any of the naive ^s enter the region of judgments presented 
by the "plant" and in each instance the shift toward the 
partner was far less than the gap that remained. In short, 
although the S's judgments in the second session shifted in
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the direction of the "plant's” judgments, without exception 
the ^'s nora in the second session was more like his norm in 
the first session than that presented by the "plant."
In the second part of the experiment, ^s were in­
formed during the initial "alone" session that the autokinetic 
effect was subjective and that the point of light actually 
did not move at all. Each ^ was given the opportunity to 
examine the apparatus and discover for herself that the 
effect was actually an illusion. Even under such circum­
stances, Sperling found that when a "plant" was introduced 
in a later session who set her judgments about five inches 
higher than the norm of the S, four out of the ten ^s were 
influenced in the usual fashion. In questioning these ^s it 
was discovered that they had either forgotten the instruc­
tions in the first session or that they did not believe them.
The results of this experiment indicate that even 
though the judgment situation may be ambiguous, ^s are not 
necessarily influenced by any social factors introduced into 
the situation. The fact that in the first part of the ex­
periment convergence was limited as compared with the con­
vergence which occurs between two naive £s, suggests that the 
discrepancy between the judgments of the ^ and "plant" may 
have been a critical factor. In the second part of the
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experiment it should be noted that in some cases, even when 
are aware that movement is illusory and the discrepancy 
between their judgments and those of the "plant" is small, 
they are nevertheless influenced in the direction of the sug­
gested norm.
An experiment by Walter (25) demonstrated that ^s 
judgments could be influenced in the direction of a "sug­
gested" norm, if that norm was within the range of their pre­
vious judgments. In this case £s in the experimental group 
served alone in one session during which each established a 
norm and range of judgment independently. Prior to the 
second session, the experimenter casually informed each ^ of 
judgments attributed to students like himself who were said 
to be attending one of two schools which the ^ had previously 
ranked high in prestige. The introduction of a "suggested" 
norm resulted in significant shifts in judgment in the 
direction of the suggestion. In every case however, the norm 
introduced was at either the 90th or the 10th percentile of 
the ^s previous judgments.
A third session followed the introduction of a "sug­
gested" norm in the second session and subsequent shifts in 
the £s judgments in the direction of that norm. In the 
third session, another norm was introduced— supposedly the
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mean of the judgments in the second school which the S had 
previously ranked high in prestige. This norm however was 
at the opposite end of the ^'s scale from the norm presented 
in Session II. With the discrepancy between these two norms, 
Walter observed that frequent norm shifts occurred and that 
^s revealed a tendency to return to the region of the origi­
nal "pre-suggestion" norm. With £s serving in the control 
group it was found that if no external factors were intro­
duced from situation to situation, the ^*s judgments tended 
to cluster around the same norm in each situation.
The above experiments indicate that in the autoki­
netic situation ^s are not influenced indiscriminately by 
social factors introduced, and further, they suggest that 
the magnitude of influence may depend upon the extent of dif­
ference between the norm of the ^ and the introduced norm.
As long as the introduced norm is very close to the range of 
judgments of the or within it (as in Walter's study), 
convergence is observed and the ^s* judgments move in the 
direction of the suggested norm. However, when substantial 
differences exist between the ^*s norm and the introduced 
suggestion regarding the extent of movement (as in Sperling's 
study), the magnitude of influence of these social factors 
is apparently substantially reduced.
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Discrepancies between Anchorages and Judgment 
Scales in Psychophysical Studies
There is also some evidence from psychophysical 
studies of judgment which indicates that the distance between 
the S's stand or position of judgment and the position intro­
duced may be a critical factor in determining the magnitude 
of influence of the introduced stand. The situation in 
which a social anchorage is introduced outside of the indi­
vidual's judgment scale may be akin to that in psychophysical 
studies when an anchorage located outside the individual's 
judgment scale is introduced. Anchorages in both of these 
situations, for example, are external stimuli which differ 
from the ^'s judgment scale.
In various psychophysical methods, the ^  is typically 
required to make a comparison between some standard stimulus 
and another stimulus. Thus judgments of "brighter" or 
"darker" are determined by the relationships between the two 
stimuli. However, other experiments, using the method of 
absolute stimuli (24), have demonstrated that judgments of 
stimuli may still be made when no standard stimulus is pres­
ent. In this case, after the ^ has been presented with a 
series of stimuli for a few rounds, a scale of judgment is 
established internally. In other words, the judgment of
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each succeeding stimulus is made by comparison with the 
stimuli or judgments which have preceded it.
In an experiment by Wever and Zener (26) ^s were 
given a "light” series of weights (84, 88, 92, 96, and 100 
grams). After Ss had made several judgments with the "light” 
series of weights, a "heavy” series was introduced (92, 96, 
100, and 108 grams). The authors report that the "effect of 
the first series on the judgments of the second series was 
quite evident for the first 20 or 25 presentations, i.e. for 
four or five rounds, judgments of 'heavy' predominated for 
all the stimuli; from this point on, however, the judgments 
showed a redistribution conforming to the second stimulus 
series” (26, pp. 475-476). In other words, when the 96 gram 
weight is compared or presented with the "light" series of 
weights, it is judged "heavy," but when it is presented with 
the "heavy" series, it is judged "light." This experiment 
demonstrates that the judgment of any particular stimulus is 
affected by its relationship within a reference scale formed 
through contact with a series of stimuli.
Other investigators have reported that reference 
scales typically have one or more outstanding items which 
have more influence than others in determining judgment, and 
these outstanding items are referred to as "anchorages” or
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"reference points" (15, 23). In psychophysical experiments 
where a standard stimulus is used, the standard stimulus is 
usually the outstanding anchorage or referent of judgment.
In experiments using the absolute method of judgment, the 
end points of the reference scale established by the 2 
usually serve as anchorages. Judgments of stimuli, then, 
are determined by the relationship between these stimuli and 
the end points or anchorages of the reference scale.
McGarvey (15) and Rogers (16) have demonstrated that 
when stimuli are introduced at various distances beyond the 
end of the scale, the whole reference scale of judgment ex­
pands in the direction of the anchorage, up to a certain 
point. However, if the anchorage introduced is removed ex­
cessively from the end of the stimulus series, instead of 
expanding, the whole reference scale of judgment contracts or 
shrinks, along with the categories within it. If the stim­
ulus introduced is not too distant from the end points of 
the scale of judgment, it becomes "assimilated" into the 
scale. On the other hand, when the stimulus introduced is 
too far beyond the end point of the scale, the "assimilation 
effect" breaks down and the scale contracts or shrinks.
When the anchorage is too distant then from the scale of 
judgment, a "contrast effect" is produced (20, pp. 65-66).
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Cohen (3) demonstrated that the "contrast effect" 
described above could be produced in judgments using verbal 
material by introducing anchorages at great distances from 
the position of items previously judged. Pairs of £s were 
asked to agree on ratings of various statements concerning 
moderately undesirable behavior such as "fishing without a 
license." When these same statements were presented a 
second time however, they were mixed in with a series of 
statements representing extremely undesirable behavior such 
as "kidnapping a baby for ransom." The extremely undesirable 
behaviors served as anchorages which were far removed from 
the statements previously presented. Ratings of the state­
ments in the second session indicated that the moderately 
undesirable behaviors seemed less serious than when they were 
judged without the context of extremely undesirable behavior. 
As Sherif and Sherif have observed in connection with this 
study, "since the shift in judgments produced by the extreme 
anchorages was away from the anchorage, the effect of the 
extreme anchorage was a contrast effect" (20, p. 572). It 
was further demonstrated that shifts in judgment were not 
simply a function of repetition of the ratings. Among con­
trol S3 who judged the moderately undesirable behaviors in 
two sessions without the extremely undesirable behaviors.
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Che racings tended Co remain abouc Che same.
The Presenc Problem
The problem of chis sCudy concerns Che effecciveness 
of experimentally introduced anchorages which differ in 
varying degrees from Che ^'s previously escablished judgmenc 
scale upon his judgmenCs of auCokineCic movemenC. Previous 
sCudies using Che auCokineCic effecC have demonscraced chac 
once an individual has established a norm of judgmenc, he 
will ordinarily maintain the same norm in subsequent sessions 
if Che condition is merely one of repetition (8, 19). How­
ever, Walter (25) has demonstrated that if, after the ^ has 
formed a stable scale of judgment, a suggestion is introduced 
to the effect that the light moves at either the 10th or the 
90th percentile of his previous judgments, a significant 
shift in the direction of the introduced suggestion or 
anchorage occurs. On the other hand, Sperling (21) found 
that if an anchorage is introduced which substantially dif­
fers from the £ ’s scale of judgment, the extent of shift in 
the direction of the anchorage is limited.
On the basis of the experiments presented in the 
preceding section it seems possible that one critical factor 
determining the effectiveness of social factors in the
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modification of Judgments In the autokinetic situation Is 
the distance or discrepancy between the norm of judgment 
established by the S and the anchorage Introduced in the 
situation. The major hypothesis to be tested in this study 
Is that the S's norm will shift in the direction of an in­
troduced anchorage as an inverse function of the discrepancy 
between the norm and the introduced anchorage. In other 
words, with the increased discrepancy between the ^'s norm 
and the introduced anchorage, the effectiveness of the 
anchorage in producing a shift in judgment will be reduced.
Thus while anchorages which differ little from the 
^'s norm would produce significant shifts in judgment, as the 
distance is increased between the two, eventually a point 
would be. reached where judgments are made by the ^ as if no 
anchorage was present. One would suspect chat if the 
anchorage is pushed still further away from the ^'s scale of 
judgment, a "contrast effect," similar to those observed in 
psychophysical experiments might be produced. In this case 
there might be a likelihood of negative shifts in judgment 
or "boomerang effects."
The data in this experiment will also provide an 
opportunity to re-examine the findings of Sherif (17),
Walter (25), and others, to the effect that when an individual
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serving alone in the autokinetic situation is repeatedly 
called upon to make judgments, in subsequent sessions he will 
tend to maintain the same norm.
Hypotheses
1. The S's norm will shift in the direction of an introduced 
anchorage as an inverse function of the discrepancy be­
tween the norm and the introduced anchorage.
a. Anchorages which are outside of the ^'s scale of 
judgment, but which lie immediately adjacent to it 
will produce significant shifts in judgment.
b. If the anchorage is sufficiently remote from the ^'s 
scale of judgment, his judgments will approximate 
those made in the first session when no anchorage 
was present.
c. As the anchorage introduced becomes increasingly re­
mote from the ^ ’s norm, the number of negative 
shifts or "boomerang effects" may increase.
2. When an individual serving alone in the autokinetic situ­
ation is called upon to make repeated judgments, he will 
tend to maintain the same norm.
CHAPTER II
APPARATUS AND SUBJECTS 
Apparatus
Two criteria were used in selecting the room in which 
the experiment was carried out. First, a large room was 
necessary because of the procedure to be followed in the ex­
periment. Second, a room was needed which had not previously 
been used as a classroom since it was highly desirable that 
none of the ^s be familiar with the dimensions of the room.
The room selected had previously been used as a graduate study 
room, and the dimensions are approximately as follows: 
length--26 feet, width--24 feet, and height— 11% feet. Win­
dows in the room were blacked out with aluminum foil and 
black scotch tape, and since no experimental session was 
carried out before 6:00 P.M., the room was completely dark 
during each session.
Furnishings in the room consisted of two large tables, 
three chairs, and a large bookcase. The autokinetic appa­
ratus rested on one of the tables at the approximate eye
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level of Che Ss. One chair was placed directly behind the 
apparatus. A second table was placed at the opposite end of 
the room, and the Ss* relay keys were placed on this table.
Two chairs were located behind the table during all experi­
mental sessions. The Ss were seated in a chair located 
exactly 18 feet from the autokinetic apparatus and directly 
in front of the apparatus. Upon entering, the S's view of 
the room was blocked by a large bookcase situated near the 
door. Each S remained between the bookcase and the door un­
til the door was closed. Lights in the room were out during 
the entire time Ss were present.
The autokinetic apparatus used in the experiment 
consists of a device which periodically exposes a dim pin­
point of light through a circular hole one millimeter in 
diameter by means of a shutter mechanism. The appearance of 
the light is controlled automatically and regulated so that 
one minute elapses between the time the light goes out and 
its reappearance. Five seconds before the light appears, 
the device presents a warning click and light flash to the 
experimenter. The light turns on automatically and remains 
on until either the ^ or experimenter depresses a relay key 
attached to the apparatus. Two seconds after one of the 
relay keys is depressed, the light is turned off automatically.
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One relay key adjoins the apparatus itself and is located on 
the experimenter's table, and two additional keys are located 
on the ^'s table at the other end of the room. Also attached 
to the main apparatus is a timer clock with a luminous second 
hand which remains in motion as lor# as the light is on.
A questionnaire which was designed for use in this 
experiment was administered following each experimental ses­
sion.^ On the questionnaire the £ was asked to indicate his 
confidence in his judgments by marking an "X” on a five inch 
continuum from ’VERY SURE" to "NOT SURE AT ALL." In addi­
tion each ^ was asked to indicate the most frequent or aver­
age distance the light moved and also to indicate the limits 
between which the light moved, i.e. smallest distance-- 
largest distance.
Following the second session, those ^s who had served 
with the "plant," were asked to write answers to the follow­
ing questions in addition to responding to the questionnaire 
again: (1) Did you feel that you were influenced by the
other individual participating in the experiment? and (2)
What do you think was the reason for the difference in your 
judgments? These two questions were not printed on the
^Sample questionnaires are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 1. Layout and dimensions of experimental room.
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questionnaire itself because the situation was presented to 
the ^ in such a way as to appear that the "plant" in the 
situation was present only because of momentary expediency. 
To have printed the questions on the questionnaire would 
have indicated to the ^ that the situation had been planned 
beforehand.
Subjects
The 50 ^s used in the experiment were all Caucasian, 
male, undergraduate students enrolled in classes in psychol­
ogy at the University of North Dakota. They ranged in age 
from 18 to 25 years, and represented majors in a variety of 
departments--Mathematics, Physical Education, Sociology, 
Physics, etc. Most of the ^s were sophomores, although all 
classes were represented.
The £s did not participate in the experiment on a 
volunteer basis; they were informed that participating in 
some psychological research was expected of them as part of 
the requirements of their courses in psychology. By making 
participation in the experiment compulsory, an effort was 
made to avoid the biased sample which conceivably results 
when individuals are asked to volunteer for such a study.
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Figure 2. The experimental apparatus and disposi­
tion in Session I; subject alone.
Figure 3. The experimental apparatus and disposi­
tion in Session II; both subject and "plant" present.
CHAPTER III
PROCEDURE
Each of the fifty £s participating in the experiment 
served in two experimental sessions separated by a time in­
terval of exactly 48 hours. In each case, the ^ served 
alone in the first experimental session.
Session I
After the ^ had reported to the offices of the De­
partment of Psychology, he was taken directly to the experi­
mental room. To prevent him from viewing the layout and 
dimensions of the room, the ^ entering the darkened room was 
asked to remain standing in the vicinity of the door until 
the door could be closed. Following this, each was led to 
the table upon which rested the ^'s relay keys. He was in­
formed that there were two chairs and that he could sit in 
either one. In a casual fashion the experimenter then re­
marked that he might have to begin running two ^s at once to
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finish the experiment at a predetermined date. When the ^ 
was comfortably seated, he was asked to feel about on the 
table until he located one of the relay boxes. The ^ was 
told that there were two boxes and that he could use either 
one--the second box being present in the eventuality of 
running two £s together. When the S had located the relay 
box the following instructions were given:
Periodically you will be shown a point of 
light. Shortly after the light comes on, it will 
begin to move. As soon as you see the light move, 
you are to press the button. Within a few 
seconds the light will go out. You are then to 
tell me as accurately as you can, the total dis­
tance the light moved during its exposure. Each 
time, shortly before the light comes on, I shall 
signal you by saying "READY.”
Please try to make your judgments as accurate 
as you can and you may make your judgments as fine 
as you deem appropriate.
Any questions?
Following a period of three minutes in which the ^ 
could adapt to the darkness, four practice judgments were 
given. Failure to follow instructions was noted during this 
period and was corrected. Following the four practice judg­
ments, the experimenter recorded 40 judgments for each 
Each judgment was recorded on a separate sheet of note paper, 
and when forty judgments had been recorded, the ^ was taken 
from the darkened room and asked to fill out the question­
naire previously described.
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The ^ was asked to report back again in 48 hours. 
The reason given for this instruction was that the entire 
experiment was too long to carry out all at once since it 
would involve sitting in the darkened room for almost two 
hours continuously if done in one session.
Session II
During the second session, the ^s served under five 
conditions designated as Conditions A, B, C, D, and E, as 
follows :
Condition A: Control Group. Ss served alone in
a second session under conditions identical with 
those in the first session.
Condition B: ^s served with a "plant” in the
second session who was a complete stranger and 
who reported movements covering a range of the 
same size as that used by the ^ in the first 
session, but with the median one inch higher than 
the largest judgment previously given by the
Condition C: ^s served in the second session
with a "plant" who was a stranger and who re­
ported movements covering a range of the same 
size as that used by the ^ in the initial ses­
sion, but extending upward from a judgment 
twice as large as the largest judgment previously 
given by the
Condition D : ^s served with a "plant" who re­
ported movements covering a range of the same 
size as that used by the £ in the first session, 
but extending upward from a judgment eight times 
as large as the largest judgment previously 
given by the
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Condition E: Ss served with a "plant" who reported
movements covering a range of the same size as that 
previously used by the ^ but extending upward from 
a judgment twelve times as large as the largest 
judgment given previously by the S.
In all cases, the range of the "plant's" judgments 
in the second session was the same as the range of the £'s 
judgments during the initial session. In other words, if 
the ^'s judgments were from 2 to 4 inches in the first ses­
sion, the range of judgments given by the "plant" in the 
second session would be 2 inches. The size of the "plant's" 
judgments was determined by the ^'s judgments during the 
first session and the particular experimental condition in 
which the S was serving as indicated above.
The distances between the ^'s norm and anchorage 
used in the experimental conditions described above were 
arrived at during pretesting. It will be noted that anchor­
ages in Conditions B and C are relatively close to the ^'s 
norm in each case, while anchorages in Conditions D and E 
are considerably more remote from the S's norm.
The individual ^ o  served as the "plant" in the ex­
periment was a complete stranger to all ^s participating. 
Since the role of the "plant" in the experiment was a crucial 
one, considerable time was spent in instructing the "plant" 
regarding the role he was to play in the experiment. At no
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time, however, was the "plant” informed as to the purposes 
of the experiment or the conditions under which ^s were being 
run. He was instructed to appear to the S as if he were in 
the autokinetic situation for the second time as a S. It 
was emphasized that he was to respond in the situation in 
much the same manner as the £ responded. That is, if the ^ 
gave his judgments in a low voice, or barely audible whisper, 
the "plant" was to make his judgments in the same tone of 
voice. On the other hand, if the ^ was to respond in a 
self-assured fashion in a loud voice, the "plant" was in­
structed to respond in the same manner. The purpose of this 
was to prevent the "plant" from influencing the £s by any 
means other than through the judgments he was giving.
The "plant" was further instructed that he was not 
to strike up conversations with the ^s, and if the ^s at­
tempted to converse in the experimental situation, he was to 
answer politely but not to attempt to maintain conversation. 
The emphasis throughout was to be on "naturalness" in 
appearing to the S as simply another naive individual par­
ticipating in the experiment. The "plant" was given the 
judgments he was to use with a particular ^  prior to report­
ing to the Department of Psychology. In each case, the 
upper and lower limits of judgment were given, and the mean
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was also provided. The "plant" was required to memorize 
these three numbers and to distribute his judgments through­
out the range with about 50 per cent of his judgments at or 
very near the mean provided. The same individual served as 
"plant" with all 40 ^s in the experimental groups and was 
paid at the rate of $1.00 per
The second experimental session was held 48 hours 
following the first session, and arrangements were made so 
that the ^ arrived at the office a few minutes before the 
"plant" arrived. When the ^ arrived he was informed that 
another participant had recently telephoned the experimenter 
to say that he would be unable to keep his appointment. He 
was further told that this person had expressed a desire to 
come in later or earlier--depending on the time of evening—  
and that if it was all right with the both of them would 
be run together to save time. All ^s accepted this explan­
ation and when the "plant" arrived some minutes later, he 
was introduced to the and both were taken to the experi­
mental room together. Every effort was made to avoid arous­
ing suspicion on the part of the ^ as to the nature of the 
experiment— even to the point of the experimenter’s "for­
getting" the "plant’s" first name when introducing the two 
individuals.
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When both the "plant" and S were being seated in the 
experimental room, the comment was casually made that "both 
of you have been in the experiment before so you know what 
it consists of." After they had both found chairs and were 
seated, both "plant" and ^ were instructed to locate the 
relay boxes on the table before them.
The procedure in the second experimental session in 
which the "plant" served with ^s was similar to that in the
first session in which the ^s served alone. Different in­
structions were given, of course, and were as follows:
Both of you have been in the experiment once 
before so you know what it is you are to do. How­
ever, I will run through the instructions again 
briefly to refresh your mind. Periodically a 
small light will come on, and shortly after it
comes on it will begin to move. As soon as you
see it begin to move, you are to press the
button. When the light goes out, you are to tell 
me as accurately as you can, how far the light 
moved.
There will be one change this time. In order 
for you not to influence each other, the same 
person should not judge first all the time. In 
other words, you will alternate giving your judg­
ments ; one of you will judge first one time, and 
the other will judge first the next time. Each 
time the light comes on then, both of you will 
judge, but you will alternate giving your judg­
ments. In each case the one who judges first 
will press the button each time.
Any questions? Which one of you will go 
first? We will dispense with the practice trials 
this time since you are both familiar with the 
procedure.
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No practice judgments were recorded during the second 
session because the experimental pretest work indicated that 
the "plant’s” influence was immediate and that the initial 
three or four judgments were important to the results of the 
study. In the second session, however, as in the first ses­
sion, a three minute period preceded the beginning of the 
experiment, to allow the ^s to become adapted to the darkness.
When forty judgments had been recorded for the 
both ^ and "plant" were taken from the room and asked to 
complete the questionnaire. The purpose of the experiment 
was not revealed to following the completion of their par­
ticipation, and they ware asked not to discuss the experi­
ment with anyone in their classes. They were informed that 
they would be told of the nature of the experiment in a class 
period later on in the semester. Discussion with at least 
half of the ^s following the conclusion of the experiment in­
dicated that at least as far as these ^s were concerned, 
there had apparently been no discussion of the experiment 
with other individuals in the classes.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The raw data of this experiment consist of the esti­
mates made by ^s of the apparent distance the light moved. 
Fifty individuals served as ^s, and each ^ made a total of 
forty judgments in each of the two sessions. For the control 
group there was a total of 800 judgments, and for the four 
experimental groups there was a total of 3,200 judgments.
Method of Analysis
In line with the statement of the problem and the 
hypotheses advanced, the treatment of the data was made in 
terms of comparison of norms of judgment under Conditions A, 
B, C, D, and E in both sessions.
The analysis of the data was aimed at determining 
shifts in judgments between sessions under all conditions.
Two different methods of determining these shifts were em­
ployed. An analysis of covariance of change scores with the
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Session I scores partialed out constituted the first method.
In the second method, the number of judgments in the second 
session falling outside the range of judgments in the first 
session for each ^ was determined, and comparisons were made 
between the various experimental conditions.
Since the distributions of judgments for individual 
^s were, in many cases markedly skewed, the measure found to 
be most representative of the central tendency of judgments 
in each distribution was the median. The medians of each of 
the distributions of 40 judgments are presented in Table 1.
It will be noted that in Session I under each condition ^s 
served in the situation alone. The mean of the medians in 
Session I for each condition is presented at the bottom of 
Table 1, and it will be observed that there is some fluctu­
ation in these means between conditions.
Comparison of Change Scores under 
Conditions A, B, C, D, and E
Change scores were calculated for each £ by subtract­
ing the median in the second session from the median in the 
first session. If the median in the second session was 
smaller than the median in the first session, the change score 
was recorded as negative, while differences in the opposite
TABLE 1
MEDIANS OF JUDGMENT OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS UNDER CONDITIONS 
A, B, C, D, AND E IN BOTH SESSIONS
Ss
Condition A 
I II
Condition B 
I II
Condition C 
I II
Condition D 
I II
Condition E 
I II
1. 1.12 1.25 1.22 2.56 .53 3.00 .91 1.03 .12 .98
2. 1.42 1.05* 1.87 4.00 .72 2.06 .97 3.50 .22 .89
3. 3.83 3.94 3.85 5.04 .89 2.03 2.83 4.27 .52 .77
4. 4.37 3.96* 4.08 6.33 1.20 3.87 8.20 8.50 1.56 2.76
5. 4.41 5.19 4.25 11.50 2.96 3.25 10.87 15.08 1.97 2.83
6. 5.21 4.94* 5.26 7.59 3.58 6.75 11.30 12.32 5.94 6.00
7. 6.14 5.75* 8.25 10.37 3.75 6.25 11.83 10.83* 6.34 6.44
8. 6.27 7.78 9.50 12.75 4.50 13.50 12.08 12.30 10.26 11.56
9. 17.75 12.05* 11,85 24.95 10.75 12.05 15.78 13.83* 11.94 4.00*
10. 29.83 31.83 11.92 17.75 11.60 18.44 17.57 15.16* 14.75 18.62
MEAN 8.04 7.77 6.20 10.28 4.04 7.12 9.23 9.68 5.36 5.48
ADJ.
MEAN
8.04 6.29 6.20 10.65 4.04 9.67 9.23 7.00 5.36 6.70
4>
o>
^Indicates median decreased in Session II
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direction were recorded as positive. These change scores, 
which may be referred to as raw change scores, are presented 
in Table 2. It will be noted that in this table the largest 
mean raw change score is found under Condition B (+4.08), 
and that the mean change scores diminish progressively under 
Conditions C, D, and E (+3.07 - + .44 - + .12 respectively).
On the basis of our first hypothesis, to the effect that 
shift in norms is an inverse function of the discrepancy be­
tween the ^'s norm and anchorage, it would be predicted that 
the largest mean change score would be found under Condition 
B and that the smallest change score would be found under 
Condition E with intermediate scores under Conditions C and D.
For purposes of analysis, all raw change scores were 
corrected by adding a constant (10.00) to eliminate negative 
signs. Bartlett*s test for homogeneity of variance was 
applied to the data and yielded a of 5.07 which is not 
significant. Analysis of variance of the data was then 
carried out. F = 3.64, .05 > P > .01.
Following the analysis of variance, t-tests were 
applied to comparisons between all the groups. These t-tests 
indicated that both Conditions B and C were significantly 
different from Conditions A, D, and E. Conditions B and C 
were not significantly different, and Conditions D and E
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TABLE 2
RAW CHANGE SCORES OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Ss
Condition
A
Condition
B
Condition
C
Condition
D
Condition
E
1. + .13 + 1.34 +2.47 + .12 + .86
2. - .37 + 2.13 +1.34 +2.53 + .67
3. + .11 + 1.19 +1.14 +1.44 + .25
4. - .41 + 2.25 +2.67 + .30 +1.20
5. + .78 + 7.25 + .29 +4.21 + .86
6. - .27 + 2.33 +3.17 +1.02 + .06
7. - .39 + 2.12 +2.50 -1.00 + .10
8. +1.51 + 3.25 +9.00 + .22 +1.30
9. -5.70 +13.10 +1.30 -1.95 -7.94
10. +2.00 + 5.83 +6.84 -2.41 +3.87
MEAN - .26 + 4.08 +3.07 + .44 + .12
ADJ.
MEAN - .28 + 4.07 +3.09 + .42 + .13
Bartlett’s Test for homogeneity of variance (9)
= 5.0782 
df = 4
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also did not differ significantly. Condition A did not dif­
fer significantly from either Condition D or Condition E.
Since the means in the initial session differed in 
the five groups, an analysis of covariance was cairried out on 
the data in Table 1 and is presented in Table 3.^ It will 
be noted that with the differences in initial means equated, 
the F of 4.86 is significant at better than the .01 level of 
confidence.
Following the analysis of covariance, the means for 
Session II were adjusted, and the mean change scores were 
also adjusted. The adjusted means for Session II are pre­
sented at the bottom of Table 1, and the adjusted mean change 
scores are presented at the bottom of Table 2 and also in 
Figure 4. It will be noted that when the means are corrected 
for differences in Session I scores, the largest mean is 
again observed under Condition B (10.65), and the size of 
the means diminishes through Conditions C, D, and E— 9.67—
An additional analysis of covariance was carried out 
on the medians in Session I for each condition and the corre­
sponding change scores. It is actually a moot point whether 
this method or the one described above is used. The F-ratio 
in this case was 37.85/7.97 which yielded an F of 4.72. The 
appropriate correction was applied to the mean change scores 
and these became: Condition A -.28; Condition B +4.07;
Condition C +3.09; Condition D + .42; Condition E + .13.
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TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE OF MEDIANS IN BOTH SESSIONS*
Source df SSx SP SSy df Ms y F**
Bet. Or. 4 585.83 85.70 151.72 4 38.39
4.86
W. Gr. 45 1576.88 1600.36 1974.98 44 7.90
Total 49 2162.71 1686.06 2126.70
*1 
=<.01
Lindquist (8)
7.00--6.70 respectively. This result is consistent with the 
first hypothesis. The correction applied to the means in 
Table 1 indicates that at least the size of the means has 
been altered slightly. Whether the change in size of means 
is sufficient to alter the statistical significance of the 
relationships must be determined through the application of 
t-tests.
Following the analysis of covariance, t-tests were 
applied to comparisons between all of the groups using the 
adjusted means, and these tests are presented in Table 4.
The formula for these particular tests is presented in Lind­
quist (9, p. 327), It will be noted that if the first 
hypothesis is substantiated, change scores should diminish 
as the anchorage introduced becomes increasingly remote from
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Figure 4. Adjusted mean change scores as a function 
of subject-"plant" discrepancy in judgment.
Change score equals the difference between mean judg­
ment in Session II and mean judgment in Session I. Adjustment 
was made following analysis of covariance.
52 
TABLE 4
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR PAIRS OF MEANS 
FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE
Groups Compared t P
A and B 3.46 <.01
A and C 2.64 <.01
A and D .54 >.05
A and E .32 >.05
B and C .77 >.05
B and D 2.88 <.01
B and E 3.13 <.01
C and D 2.04 <.05
C and E 2.35 <.05
D and E .19 >.05
the norm established by the The crucial comparisons in 
this case are between Conditions B and D, B and E, C and D, 
and C and E. Significant differences are noted between B 
and D and Between B and E. The differences between C and D 
and between C and E were also found to be statistically sig­
nificant. The tests of the differences between B and C and 
between D and E were found to be not significant at the .05 
level.
It can be seen from the data in Table 4 that control­
ling the variability among groups in Session I through the
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use of analysis of covariance alters the size of the means 
in Session II somewhat, but not enough to alter the trends 
of statistical significance. The same comparisons which 
were significant using the ordinary t-test were significant 
when variability among groups in Session I was partialed out. 
And the same comparisons which were not significant when 
variability in Session I was not partialed out, remain not 
significant when controls were applied through the use of 
analysis of covariance. However, by partialing out the 
variability among groups in Session I, we have achieved a 
greater degree of precision statistically and can be confi­
dent that the relative size of means in Session II reflects 
the differences in experimental treatments.
The data in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothe­
sis that shift in judgment is an inverse function of the 
discrepancy between the norm of the ^ and the introduced 
anchorage. From this table it can be inferred that anchor­
ages close to the ^'s norm, i.e. as in Conditions B and C, 
result in greater shifts in judgment than anchorages which 
are more remote, i.e. as in Conditions D and E. Although 
the differences between Conditions B and C and between Con­
ditions D and E were found to be not statistically signifi­
cant, the direction of the differences is in line with
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hypothesis #1. It is important in this study, however, to 
attempt to account for the lack of significant differences 
in these two comparisons.
There are two possible explanations for the lack of 
significant differences between B and C and between D and E. 
The first, and most obvious possibility, is that there 
simply is not enough difference in the experimental treat­
ments in these conditions. Thus the anchorage introduced 
experimentally in Condition B may not be sufficiently differ­
ent from that introduced in Condition C for a difference to 
be reflected in the change scores under these conditions.
And the same thing may be true of Conditions D and E.
There is, however, an alternative explanation of the 
lack of a significant difference between B and C. It is 
possible that measuring change or shift in judgments by 
obtaining the difference between the median in Session I and 
the median in Session II may not be completely satisfactory 
in this case. If the anchorage introduced in Session II is 
fairly close to the ^'s norm--as in Condition B--even though 
the S shifted so completely as to adopt the norm presented 
by the "plant,” his absolute shift in judgment might be less 
than that which would be expected to occur in the other con­
ditions. A simple example will illustrate this point. If a
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S's norm is six inches in Session I and an anchorage is in­
troduced at eight inches, a 100 per cent shift to the anchor­
age will yield a raw change score of only two inches. On 
the other hand, a raw change score of two inches under the 
other conditions could represent only a fraction of the dis­
tance between the ^'s norm and the introduced anchorage.
Thus by using raw change scores as an index of judgmental 
shift, the difference between Conditions B and C is not 
statistically significant.
The lack of a significant difference between Condi­
tions D and E may also be interpreted in one of two ways. As 
stated previously, the possibility exists that Conditions D 
and E are not sufficiently differentiated with respect to 
the anchorages introduced. An equally plausible explanation, 
however, is that convergence ceases completely when an 
anchorage as large as that used in Condition D, or larger, 
is introduced. In other words, the data suggest that under 
the experimental conditions of the present study the point 
where convergence stops is approximately eight times the ^'s 
largest judgment. It may be assumed that anchorages larger 
than this are equally ineffective in bringing about shifts 
in norms.
Sub-hypothesis la is substantiated by the data
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presented in Tables 1» 2, 4, end Figure 4. This hypothesis 
states that anchorages which are outside of the S's scale of 
judgment, but which lie immediately adjacent to it will pro­
duce significant shifts in judgment. Examination of the 
tables and figure mentioned above indicates that the greatest 
shift in judgment from Session I to Session II occurred among 
in Condition B. It will be recalled that in this condi­
tion the discrepancy between anchorage and S's norm was 
smaller than in any of the other conditions, and in each case 
the anchorage introduced was immediately adjacent to the £'s 
scale of judgment in Session I.
Sub-hypothesis lb states that if the anchorage is 
sufficiently remote from the S's scale of judgment, his judg­
ments will approximate those made in the first session when 
no anchorage was present. It is important to note the com­
parisons between Conditions A and B, A and C, A and D, and A 
and E, in this connection. The results in Table 4 indicate 
that the differences between A and B and A and C are signif­
icant at better than the .01 level of confidence. However, 
the differences between Conditions A and D, and A and E 
proved to be not significant. The fact that the differences 
between A and D, and between A and E are not significant 
warrants the inference that if the anchorage is so remote
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from the norm of the ^ as to appear "unreasonable” to him, 
his Judgments will approximate those made when no anchorage 
was present.
Relevant to sub-hypothesis Ic concerning the number 
of negative or "boomerang effects," the data presented in 
Table 2 indicate that under Conditions B and C, not one £ 
exhibited negative change scores, while in Condition D three 
Ss and in Condition E one ^  revealed negative shifts in judg­
ment. It is significant that these negative scores start 
appearing when the anchorage introduced is eight times the 
S*s maximum judgment. Although the difference between the 
number of negative change scores found under Conditions D and 
E is not significant, the data in this table are not incon­
sistent with the hypothesis that the number of "boomerang 
effects" increases as the introduced anchorage becomes more 
remote from the norm of the It cannot be said, however, 
that the data in this study fully substantiate such an 
hypothesis.
According to the second hypothesis being tested, if 
an individual serving alone in the autokinetic situation is 
repeatedly called upon to make judgments, in subsequent ses­
sions he will tend to maintain the same norm. This hypothesis 
is substantiated by the results presented in Table 2 under
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Condition A. It will be noted that changes in judgment which 
occurred from the first session to the second session under 
this condition were very slight— a mean change of - .26 
inches.
It should be pointed out that there are individual 
differences among ^s in the extent to which their judgments 
are modified by the various anchorages introduced. Thus 
while in general we note that anchorages close to the £'s 
norm are more effective in causing judgmental shifts than 
anchorages more remote, some ^s in Condition E shifted their 
judgments more than some ^s in Condition B. This same ob­
servation has been made by Asch (1) and others in similar 
studies. Regardless of whether the stimulus situation is 
highly-structured and meaningful, or poorly-structured and 
ambiguous, some individuals appear to be more susceptible to 
the influence of various social factors than others.
In summary, from the results presented in Tables 1 
through 4, it may be inferred that:
1. Anchorages which are relatively close to the ^*s 
norm (i.e. Conditions B and C) result in significantly 
greater shifts in norms than anchorages which are more remote 
from the £'s (i.e. Conditions D and E).
2. When the introduced anchorage is remote from the
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2's norm, his judgments will approximate those made when no 
anchorage was present.
3. There is a possibility that negative shifts will 
increase as the introduced anchorage becomes more remote from 
the ^'s norm, although the data in this study do not fully 
substantiate such a hypothesis.
4. When ^s serving alone are repeatedly called upon 
to make judgments, in subsequent sessions they will tend to 
maintain the same norm or central tendency of judgment.
5. There are individual differences in the extent 
to which Ss are influenced under all conditions.
Comparisons of the Number of Judgments in Session II 
Falling outside of the Session _I Range 
under Conditions A, B, C, D , E
Table 5 summarizes the number of judgments in the 
second session for each ^ which fall outside the range of 
judgments established in the initial session. Comparisons 
were made between conditions using Wilcoxon's test of un­
paired replicates. Results of these tests are shown in 
Table 6.
If no change in judgment occurs from the first to 
the second session, the S would be expected to distribute
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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF JUDGMENTS IN SESSION II FALLING OUTSIDE RANGE 
OF JUDGMENTS IN SESSION I FOR INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Ss ConditionA
Condition
B
Condition
C
Condition
D
Condition
E
1. 0 0 0 0 0
2. 0 0 2 0 0
3. 0 2 3 0 0
4. 0 5 10 0 0
5. 0 6 12 0 0
6. 0 7 15 3 1
7. 0 12 17 4 3
8. 0 21 20 7 4
9. 1 24 26 10 6
10. 2 26 38 15 6
Mean .30 10.90 14.30 3.90 2.00
H = 16.01
P = <.01
df = 4
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TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF JUDGMENTS IN SESSION II 
FALLING OUTSIDE SESSION I RANGE 
FOR INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS*
Comparisons Rank Total P
A and B 67. <.01
A and C 57.5 (.01
A and D 81. >.05
A and E 82.5 >.05
B and C 98. >.05
B and D 83.5 >.05
B and E 77. (.05
C and D 68. (.01
C and E 52.5 (.01
D and E 96. >.05
*Wilcoxon's Test--Unpaired Replicates
62
his judgments over approximately the same range in both ses­
sions. That this is a justified assumption is substantiated 
by the results obtained from the control group (Condition A) 
in which the mean change in central tendency from Session I 
to Session II was very slight. It will be noted that out of 
ten ^s under Condition A, only two made any judgments in the 
second session which were outside of the range of judgments 
for the first session. Of the two ^s who did judge outside 
of the range, only three of their combined 80 judgments fell 
outside. On the other hand, examination of the data from ^ s 
under Condition B, indicates that all but two ^s made judg­
ments in the second session which were outside the initial 
range of judgments. In this case the number of judgments 
(out of 40 possible) which fell outside of the initial range 
went as high as 26 for one ^s serving under Condition C 
showed even a greater tendency to judge outside of their 
initial range in Session II. However, the difference between 
Conditions B and C in this respect is not significant. It 
will be recalled that in the experimental conditions, the 
"plant" in Condition B distributed his judgments over a range 
which extended downward into the upper part of the ^*s prior 
range. Because of this it would be expected that ^s in 
Condition B would show less tendency to judge outside of
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their initial ranges than would in Condition C. Ss serv­
ing under Condition D revealed a markedly reduced tendency 
to judge outside of their initial range as compared with ^s 
under Conditions B and C, and for under Condition E, this 
tendency was reduced still further.
The data in Table 5 were analyzed through the use of 
the Kruskal-Wallis H-test since the distribution of scores 
under each of the four conditions is markedly skewed. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test yielded an H of 16.01 which is signifi­
cant at better than the .01 level of confidence. Tests for 
the significance of differences were applied to comparisons 
between Conditions A and B, A and C, A and D, A and E, B and 
C, B and D, B and E, C and D, C and E, and D and E. Results 
of these tests are shown in Table 6.
The difference between Conditions A and B was found 
to be significant at less than the .01 level and reflects 
the difference in means of .30 for Condition A and 10.90 for 
Condition B. When an anchorage was introduced which was not 
substantially different from the norm of the the tendency 
was for the ^ to distribute his judgments over a different 
range. However, as the anchorage became more remote from the 
S's norm, the results indicate the tendency for ^ s to either 
maintain the same range of judgments or to reduce the range.
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Coaipârl»ona of the data between Conditions A and D, and A 
and E (not significant at the .05 level) indicate that under 
these three conditions, Sa* Judgments in the second session 
tend to be distributed within the range of judgments estab­
lished during the initial session.
The data presented in Table 6 support the findings 
revealed through the analysis of the change scores and permit 
the following inferences to be made:
1. When Ss serving alone are repeatedly called upon 
to make judgments under identical conditions, they will tend 
to distribute their judgments within the range previously 
established.
2. As the introduced anchorage becomes increasingly 
remote from the norm of the the tendency of the ^ to judge 
outside of his previous range is reduced.
Related Data
After each session ^s were requested to indicate the 
degree of certainty they felt regarding their judgments by 
marking an "X” on a five-inch continuum ranging from '*VERY 
SURE” to "NOT SURE AT ALL." Ss serving in the control group 
and in the two experimental conditions in which the intro­
duced anchorage was considerably remote from their own scale
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of Judgment tended to become more confident of their Judg­
ments in the second session than did ^s in the other two 
groups.
^s serving in Conditions D and E indicated that they 
felt more confident of their Judgments in the second session, 
while ^s serving in Conditions B and C tended to feel less 
confident. It is interesting to note in this connection, 
th . reactions of ^s to the experimental situation as ex­
pressed by them in informal discussions and in response to 
the questionnaire following the conclusion of the experiment.
Frcxn these discussions with ^s following the experi­
ment, it appears that in each case the £ assumed that the 
issue involved was one of fact and that a correct response 
was possible. The ^ also believed that only one response 
was correct and that both he and the other individual were 
oriented to and reporting about the same objective situation.
As in Asch's study (2) reported earlier, when the ^ 
first found himself in disagreement with the other individual 
present, there was a tendency toward surprise and increased 
attention to the task. This appeared to be especially true 
among ^s where the discrepancy between their judgments and 
those of the "plant" was great. And there was also a tend­
ency for £s under these conditions to develop hypotheses to
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explain logically the great difference between their judg­
ments and those of the "plant.” Unlike Ash's ^s however, 
these hypotheses did not appear to focus on the ^ himself as 
a source of difficulty, but tended to "explain" the dis­
crepancy in terms of the situation or some shortcoming in the 
other individual. It should be pointed out that in Asch's 
experiment, ^s participated under conditions where from seven 
to nine people were unanimously contradicting the ^s ' judg­
ments about a well-structured and meaningful situation. In 
circumstances such as these it was more difficult for the ^  
to "explain" the situation in terms of the other individuals 
involved, i.e. an erring majority.
Particularly interesting in the present study was the 
tendency of ^s in Groups D and E to focus their hypotheses 
concerning the discrepancy on the other individual in the 
situation, or on the situation itself. A general trend was 
noted in the types of hypotheses formulated by ^ s in differ­
ent groups. On the whole, "explanations" of the discrepancy 
in terms of error on the part of the "plant" appeared to be 
greater in those Ss where the discrepancy between their judg­
ments and those of the "plant" was great. When the discrep­
ancy was slight, the tendency was to explain the difference 
more in terms of the indefiniteness of the situation, etc.
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The most typical of the hypotheses developed by Ss
to "explain" the obvious discrepancy between their judgments
and those of the "plant" indicated that they believed the
"plant" to be overestimating the distance between himself and
the light. The following are responses of this type:
I thought second person thought that the light was a 
greater distance away.
Difference in estimated distances possibly due to 
differences in estimated distance from light.
The difference in my answers and the answers the 
other person gave was due to the misjudgment in 
the distance the light was away from us.
I felt the difference in answers came from the 
disagreement about how far away the light was.
The difference in judgment was probably due to 
the person's idea where the light was situated.
Some ^s formulated hypotheses explaining the situa­
tion in terms of the "eyesight differences" between them­
selves and the "plant." It is interesting that in some of 
these hypotheses, there was a tendency to attribute the dif­
ference in judgments to the "plant's" "poor eyesight":
The only thing I can think of was the difference in 
a person's eyesight.
Either eyesight or lack of knowledge of distance.
His poor eyesight might do it. Poor value of 
distance.
Lack an idea— perhaps eyesight.
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A wide variety of other answers concerning differ­
ences in "depth perception," "reaction-time," etc., reflects 
attempts to logically interpret the obvious discrepancy in 
the situation:
The reason for the different judgments was that we 
could have been looking in different places when the 
light was turned on.
Depth perception, reaction, timing.
I believe the reason for the differences of our 
answers was that we had different depth perceptions.
Each of us possibly was thinking along different 
lines as to how the light was being focused.
It may have been because of darkness and the way 
my eyes are first adjusted when I start seeing the 
light.
The reason there was such a difference between the 
distance judged between myself and White, could 
have possibly been that he (White) was a service 
man in the Air Force and had come in contact with 
this principal before.
It will be noted that in some of the statements 
given above, the ^ obviously places the responsibility for 
error on himself. There were of course, individual differ­
ences in this respect and even in those conditions where the 
discrepancy between the "plant*s" judgments and those of the 
^ was large, there were some ^s who focused the source of 
error on themselves.
Eight of the Ss in the experiment indicated that they
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had no idea whatsoever which would account for the discrep­
ancy, and several other ^s developed hypotheses which are 
difficult to interpret:
I think the difference was due to individual opinion.
It must be a completely mental state. The individual 
judges it according to various ideas he may have 
about as to how much the differences in distance may 
influence size (as he sees it).
The difference between the two of us showed that 
we thought that the dot moved faster or slower.
I think the speed of the light and how long the 
light traveled was what I based mine on.
He undoubtedly reacts to light at distances in the 
dark different than I.
Possibly that darkness seems to give the impression 
of no time or space.
Among ^s serving in those conditions where the dis­
crepancy between their judgments and those of the "plant" 
was large, the following reaction to the judgments of the 
"plant" is typical: "At first I was surprised by the other
fellow's judgments, but I couldn't see how I could be that 
far off so after the first couple of judgments I ignored 
what he said." This ^ incidentally indicated greater con­
fidence in his judgments in the second session than he had 
in the first session.
The question, "What do you think was the reason for
70
the difference in your judgments?" was included in the ques­
tionnaire originally because of the necessity of maintaining 
a check on the success of the "plant" in carrying out his 
role. It was felt that if the ^ suspected the "plant" was 
actually cooperating with the experimenter, this fact would 
be revealed in the response to this particular question.
From the response to this question and from discus­
sions with ^s following completion of the entire experiment, 
it was evident that the "plant" had given a convincing im­
pression of being a "naive" individual in the situation. No 
^  indicated that he suspected the "plant" was cooperating 
with the experimenter.
Ss in Conditions B, C, D, and E were also asked to 
indicate on the questionnaire administered following the 
second session, if they felt they had been influenced by the 
judgments of the other individual in the situation. Since 
"being influenced" by someone has rather negative connota­
tions, at least in our culture, there would probably be a 
reticence on the part of £s to admit they had been influ­
enced, even if they felt they had. Nevertheless, under 
Conditions B and C, where ^ s had in fact been influenced to 
a greater extent than under the other two conditions, there 
did seem to be a tendency for some Ss to be aware of this.
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However, out of ten serving under Condition C, seven gave 
fairly unequivocal "No's" in response to this question. In­
terestingly enough, one ^ who shifted about two Inches in the 
direction of the anchorage, when asked, "Were you influenced 
by the other person," responded that "I was strengthened in 
my own convictions slightly." All twenty £s under Conditions 
D and E gave unequivocal negative responses to this ques­
tion. One response which gives an idea of the reason for 
the lack of change under Condition E was as follows: "No,
the other person's distances were too far from mine."
In general there appeared to be a greater tendency 
for ^s serving under Conditions D and E to simply ignore the 
judgments of the "plant," while ^ s serving under Conditions 
B and C found this more difficult since the judgments given 
by the "plant" were not substantially different from their 
own. In spite of this, only a few ^ s who had in fact moved 
in the direction of the "plant" reported that they felt they 
had been influenced. Even some ^s who stated that the light 
seemed to be moving further during the second session than 
it did in the first session indicated they felt they had not 
been influenced by the "plant's" judgments.
As a check on carelessness on the part of any S be­
coming a significant factor in determining change from
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Session I to Session II, Ss were asked to indicate the aver­
age distance the light moved and the limits between which the 
light moved following Session I. Prior to the experiment it 
was believed that if a great discrepancy existed between the 
actual judgments of the ^ and the indicated judgments, a 
significant change occurring in Session II might be attribut­
able to carelessness or lack of interest in Session I. How­
ever, the results indicate that all Ss in the experiment 
were able to report the limits within which they had judged 
and the central tendency of judgments with remarkable accu­
racy. The same information was obtained from ^s following 
Session II, and an inspection of this data indicates a 
slightly greater tendency toward accuracy than in Session I. 
We would attribute this to the likelihood of greater ego- 
involvment in the Ss in the second session.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Implications of the Present Study 
for Attitude Change
Studies of attitude change have for the most part, 
been unconcerned with relating the area of attitude change 
to other areas in psychology. There have been few attempts, 
for example, to relate attitude change to principles of 
judgment, perception, motivation, etc. And in pointing out 
the emerging areas of research in communication and persua­
sion, Howland, Janis, and Kelley (7, p. 285) emphasize this 
point when they state that "our experience in the field of 
persuasion emphasizes the extent to which progress in this 
area is dependent upon further advances in basic theory in 
psychology as a whole." They emphasize the necessity of a 
more intensive study of judgmental phenomena, of research 
directed toward integrating the fields of perception and
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attitude, and of a more substantial basis for understanding 
the nature of concept formation as it relates to communica­
tion and attitude change. These are, they say, "the topics 
which one feels afterward he should have been concentrating 
on from the start" (p. 281).
The present experiment is concerned primarily with 
the study of one type of social influence (i.e. the spoken 
judgments of a "plant" who is interpersonally neutral to the 
^s) in the modification of judgments in an unstructured stim­
ulus situation. But it is believed that the results of this 
study may shed some light on the judgmental components in­
volved in attitude functioning and change.
Both perception and judgment play a significant role 
in attitude change. If an attitude is to be modified, the 
individual must perceive some stimulus relative to that atti­
tude, whether it be a communication read by some psychologist 
or a decision agreed upon by individuals in a group of which 
the person happens to be a member. Further, when an individ­
ual with a definite attitude is presented with some communi­
cation or stimulus relative to that attitude, his perception 
and judgment of the stimulus and subsequent reaction to it 
will be determined not only by the stimulus involved but also 
by his particular attitude. Thus, both the individual's
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attitude and the stimulus presented may function as anchor­
ages in determining perception and judgment. In view of this, 
it seems possible that we may be able to understand the in­
dividual's reaction to a particular stimulus or communication 
in terms of the relationship between these anchorages.
It has been pointed out that "the individual's stand 
on an issue and the contents of the stimulus material pre­
sented do not usually represent single points on a scale"
(20, p. 573). Rather it is said, each stand or position 
represents a portion of the scale which may be more or less 
clearly defined in different cases. In most cases the indi­
vidual has what may be termed a "latitude of acceptance" for 
positions near his own. In general, the more narrow his 
latitude of acceptance, the less tolerant he is for other 
positions on the issue and the more intensely he rejects them.
In order to understand an individual's reaction to a 
particular stimulus or communication then, it would be 
necessary to be aware of his position or latitude of accept­
ance, the range of positions presented to him, and the dis­
tance between his own position and that presented to him.
On the basis of the hypotheses in the present experi­
ment, and the results of previous studies of judgment, we 
would predict a greater likelihood of shifts in attitude when
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Che distance between the position or stand of the individual 
and the position presented is not great. In other words, 
the likelihood that a shift in attitude would occur would de­
crease as the magnitude of the distance between the ^'s 
point of view and the stand presented increased.
In terms of the basic principles involved, the pres­
ent experiment might be considered as roughly analogous to an 
attitude change situation. The ^ in the first session forms 
a relatively stable norm regarding the amount of movement of 
the light. In the second session, his norm of judgments in 
the first session serves as an anchorage in the determination 
of further judgments. However, the spoken judgments of the 
confederate or "plant" in the situation also function as 
anchorages in determining judgment. Thus the individual's 
perception and judgment of movement in the second session may 
be understood in terms of the relationship between these 
anchorages. Simply because the judgment situation is highly 
ambiguous does not mean that social factors operate in an 
unlimited way in the modification of judgment. In this case, 
when the anchorage introduced by the "plant" is unusually 
remote from the ^'s scale of judgment, his judgment in the 
situation is determined primarily by his norm of judgment 
established in the first session. However, when the norm
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Introduced by the "plant” is immediately adjacent or very 
close to his own range of judgments, the S's judgments are 
determined both by his previous judgments and those of the 
"plant.”
It should be pointed out however, that the present 
experiment was carried out in a relatively unstructured or 
ambiguous judgment situation. This was deliberately done 
since the influence of social factors on judgment is maxi­
mized under such circumstances and the present experiment 
deals primarily with such social influences. In a highly- 
structured task, as in Asch's study (1), it seems likely 
that the stand presented in a communication would have to be 
much closer to the ^*s stand to be effective in modifying 
judgment than was the case in the present experiment.
It should further be noted that in an actual communi­
cation setting, other factors aside from the stand presented 
may function as anchorages. Some of these factors will be 
referred to in the section devoted to suggestions for further 
research.
Suggestions for Further Research
The trend in studies of attitude change has been in 
the direction of investigating problems in the area from the
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point of view of the basic psychological processes involved-- 
perception, judgment, concept formation, etc. It has been 
suggested (7) that if investigators had concentrated their 
efforts on such studies from the start, the area of attitude 
change would be far in advance of where it is today. The 
present investigation was formulated in line with the trend 
of contemporary studies. It was believed more feasible to 
begin by investigating the problem using a relatively simple 
stimulus situation under laboratory conditions where strict 
controls could be adequately applied, than to attempt to 
utilize an actual communication setting. Because of the 
fact that the autokinetic situation has been previously used 
in the investigation of social norms, the formation of atti­
tudes, etc., if utilized in the proper experimental design, 
it should provide a means for testing hypotheses concerning 
attitude change as well.
In terms of the psychological processes involved, 
the autokinetic situation as utilized in this experiment is 
analogous to an actual communication setting. However, as 
is the case with any laboratory study, until the conclusions 
are verified in a lifelike situation, using concrete atti­
tudes, they must be regarded as tentative.
The first suggestion for further research in this
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area therefore, is to investigate the major hypothesis pre­
sented in this study in an actual communication setting. An 
experiment could be designed in which factors such as source 
of communication, medium of communication, audience char­
acteristics, etc., would be held constant for two groups 
while the factor of distance between audience attitudes and 
the communication was varied. It would also be desirable to 
test the hypothesis using different attitudes since previous 
research indicates the possibility that hypotheses holding 
true with one attitude may be invalid with another.
Since factors such as who presents the communication, 
the way in which it is presented, etc., operate in an actual 
communication setting, it would be desirable to investigate 
the relationship between these factors and the variable of 
distance, both in the laboratory using the autokinetic effect 
and in real-life situations as well. Thus an experiment 
might be designed using the autokinetic effect in which the 
groups were constituted in the same way as in the present 
experiment. With half of the £s in each group, however, the 
"plant" in the situation might be a person of high prestige 
in their eyes, and with the other half the "plant" might be 
a stranger. We would predict that more shift would occur in 
the judgments of the Ss serving with the prestigeful "plant"
Il
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than with Sa serving with a stranger, but that comparatively 
the results would be the same as in the present experiment 
with respect to the different groups, i.e. the greater the 
distance between previous judgments of the Ss and those of 
the "plant,” the smaller would be the shift in the direction 
of the "plant's" judgments, regardless of whether the "plant" 
was prestigeful or not.
Following the leads in Asch's study (2), it would be 
of interest to investigate the effects of increasing the 
group pressures on the ^ by increasing the number of "plants 
in the autokinetic situation. If say from seven to nine 
"plants" served with each S, it might be anticipated that 
even the most remote anchorages used in the present study 
would be significantly more effective in modifying the S's 
judgments.
Summary
Fifty Caucasian, male, undergraduate students were 
selected from undergraduate courses in psychology at the 
University of North Dakota and divided into five groups of 
ten ^ s each. Each ^ served in two experimental sessions 
separated by a 48 hour period, in which he was required to 
make a series of judgments regarding the extent of
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autoklnedc movement observed. In each case, the ^ served 
alone in the first session and made a series of 40 judgments 
from which a median was computed.
In the second session the ^s served under one of
five different conditions. One group of £s served as a con­
trol group and in the second session made a series of judg­
ments under conditions identical with those in the first
session. Ss in the remaining four groups served with a 
"plant" or confederate in the second session who was pre­
sented as simply another naive individual participating in 
the experiment. The "plant" in the situation made judgments 
which differed from those previously given by the The 
magnitude of the range used by the "plant," however, was the 
same as that used by each S. In other words, if the ^*s 
judgments were from two to eight inches in the initial ses­
sion— a range of six inches— the "plant's" judgments in the 
second session also covered a range of six inches. With ^s 
in one experimental group, however, the range of judgments 
given by the "plant" extended upward from a point somewhere 
in the upper part of the S's range. The median of the 
"plant’s" judgments was set one inch higher than the largest 
judgment previously given by the In a second group, the 
"plant's" judgments extended upward from a judgment twice as
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large as the largest judgment given by the ^ in the first 
session. And in a third group, the "plant's" judgments 
covered a range beginning with an estimate about eight times 
as large as the maximum judgment previously given by the S. 
And with the fourth experimental group, the range began with 
a judgment twelve times as large as the largest judgment 
previously given.
The treatment of the data was made in terms of com­
parison of norms of judgment under the various experimental 
conditions. Two types of analyses were employed. The first 
analysis, aimed at determining shifts in central tendency 
between sessions, was accomplished in the following way: 
Change scores were computed for each ^ by subtracting the 
median of judgments in the second session from the median in 
the first session. If the median in the second session was 
smaller than the median in the first session, the change 
score was recorded as negative, and if the median in the 
second session was larger, the change score was recorded as 
positive. An analysis of covariance of these change scores 
with the Session I scores partialed out was then performed.
A second analysis of the data was carried out by calculating 
the number of judgments in the second session falling out­
side the range of judgments in the first session for each S.
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The results indicate that anchorages close to the 
£'s previously established range and norm result in greater 
shifts in judgment than do anchorages which are more remote 
from the ^*s norm. In general, it was observed that as the 
discrepancy increases between the ^'s scale of judgment and 
the introduced anchorage, the effectiveness of the anchorage 
in producing a shift in judgment is reduced. The extent of 
shifts in norms was significantly greater in the group in 
which the smallest discrepancy existed between ^s* and 
"plant's" judgments. As the discrepancy increased, there was 
a tendency on the part of the ^s to maintain the same norm 
of judgment exhibited in the first session. And finally, as 
the discrepancy became extremely large, there was an in­
creased tendency for some ^s to exhibit negative shifts in 
judgment.
Individual differences were observed among ^s par­
ticipating in the experiment in the extent to which they 
were influenced by the "plant" in the different experimental 
conditions. Thus some £s were influenced more under the ex­
treme conditions, i.e. a great discrepancy between their 
judgments and those of the "plant," than were other ^s who 
served with the "plant" where the "plant's" judgments were 
not greatly different from their own.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRES
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NAME
Please answer the following questions as accurately as you 
can :
1. Indicate with an "X" on the line below, how sure you 
were of your judgments as to how far the light moved:
i___________________________________________________/
VERY SURE NOT SURE AT ALL
2. What was the average distance the light moved?
3. Between what limits did the light move?
From  (anallest Distance) to  (Largest Distance).
(Administered to all subjects following Session I, and to 
Control Subjects following both sessions.)
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NAME
Please answer the following questions as accurately as 
you can:
1. Indicate with an "X” on the line below, how sure you 
were of your judgments as to how far the light moved:
i_________________________________________________/
VERY SURE NOT SURE AT ALL
2. What was the average distance the light moved?
3. Between what limits did the light move?
From  (Snallest Distance) to  (Largest Distance).
**4. Did you feel that you were influenced by the other 
individual participating in the experiment?
**5. What do you think was the reason for the difference 
in your judgments?
(Administered to subjects in Conditions B, C, D, and E, 
following the second session.)
**Presented to subjects verbally--not printed on 
questionnaire.
APPENDIX II
RECORD OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE 
CONTROL GROUP
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Al AI A2 A2
Session I Session II Session I Session II
2.00 2.00 3.00 1.50
1.00 1.50 2 . 50 . 75
1.00 I.OO 2.50 1.50
1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 1.50 2.50
1.00 2.00 2.00 1.75
1.50 2.50 1.50 2.75
1.00 2.00 2.00 1.50
1.50 I.OO I.OO 1.50
1.50 2.00 I.OO 1.75
1.00 3.00 1.50 1.75
1.00 2.00 I.OO 1.25
1.50 2.00 1.75 I.OO
1.00 1.00 I.OO I.OO
1.00 I.OO 1.50 I.OO
1.50 2.00 1.00 1.00
1.50 I.OO .50 1.25
1.00 1.00 1.50 .75
1.00 2.00 1.50 1.00
1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.75 1.75
.50 2.00 1.50 .75
1.00 1.00 4.00 .50
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.25
1.00 2.00 1.25 .75
1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 .75 .50
2.00 2.00 1.25 1.00
1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
1.50 2.00 1.50 .75
1.00 1.00 1.25 .75
.50 1.00 2.00 1.00
2.00 1.00 2.00 1.50
1.00 1.00 2.50 .75
1.00 1.00 1.00 .75
1.00 1.00 1.50 1.25
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.25
1.00 1.00 2.00 .75
1.00 1.00 .75 1.00
1.50 2.00 1.25 .50
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A5 A5 A6 A6
Session I Session 11 Session 1 Session 11
3.00 5.00 4.00 4.00
3.00 7.00 3.00 6.00
4.00 6.00 5.00 5.00
7.00 7.00 4.00 7.00
3.00 7.00 6.00 5.00
2.00 6.00 4.00 3.00
4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00
3.00 5.00 8.00 4.00
6.00 7.00 4.00 3.00
8.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
8.00 8.00 6.00 4.00
7.00 5.00 3.00 5.00
5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
4.00 6.00 7.00 3.00
4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
5.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
3.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
5.00 4.00 8.00 3.00
5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
5.00 5.00 7.00 4.00
5.00 9.00 5.00 5.00
6.00 5.00 3.00 6.00
5.00 6.00 6.00 7.00
4.00 5.00 5.00 7.00
5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
4.00 6.00 9.00 5.00
6.00 5.00 7.00 8.00
3.00 6.00 6.00 7.00
4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00
5.00 5.00 3.00 8.00
4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
4.00 7.00 4.00 5.00
6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00
4.00 5.00 8.00 3.00
3.00 4.00 6.00 4.00
5.00 6.00 7.00 6.00
4.00 8.00 8.00 4.00
3.00 6.00 4.00 7.00
5.00 4.00 6.00 6.00
4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00
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A7 A7 A8 A8
Session I Session II Session I Session II
10.00 8.00 10.00 6.00
8.00 7.00 4.00 6.00
10.00 7.00 6.00 6.00
8.00 7.00 4.00 8.00
5.00 6.00 5.00 7.00
7.00 6.00 4.00 8.00
4.50 6.00 6.00 8.00
7.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
5.00 4.00 6.00 14.00
5.00 4.00 4.00 10.00
7.00 4.00 6.00 6.00
5.00 5.00 5.00 14.00
5.00 5.00 2.00 6.00
5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00
6.00 5.00 3.00 4.00
6.00 5.00 4.00 12.00
4.50 5.50 1.00 4.00
5.00 6.50 6.00 8.00
8.00 6.00 5.00 10.00
7.00 5.00 7.00 10.00
7.00 5.00 6.00 6.00
7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
6.00 6.00 6.00 8.00
6.00 6.50 8'.00 12.00
6.00 7.00 14.00 14.00
6.00 6.00 6.00 12.00
6.00 6.00 10.00 4.00
6.00 6.00 24.00 14.00
6.00 5.50 10.00 16.00
6.00 6.00 24.00 12.00
7.00 6.00 8.00 10.00
6.00 7.00 8.00 10.00
6.00 5.00 18.00 4.00
5.00 6.00 12.00 8.00
6.00 5.00 18.00 2.00
7.00 5.00 10.00 4.00
5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
6.00 5.00 24.00 3.00
8.00 4.00 12.00 14.00
7.00 5.00 8.00 6.00
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A9 A9 A 10 A 10
Session I Session II Session I Session
12.00 12.00 36.00 20.00
24.00 12.00 24.00 24.00
18.00 12.00 36.00 30.00
24.00 12.00 24.00 36.00
18.00 15.00 30.00 32.00
30.00 12.00 12.00 28.00
24.00 10.00 30.00 34.00
18.00 14.00 24.00 26.00
18.00 12.00 20.00 30.00
18.00 12.00 12.00 32.00
24.00 6.00 18.00 36.00
24.00 10.00 20.00 28.00
18.00 6.00 30.00 38.00
15.00 12.00 20.00 34.00
18.00 15.00 24.00 28.00
24.00 12.00 28.00 34.00
10.00 6.00 30.00 38.00
14.00 12.00 15.00 30.00
12.00 15.00 20.00 32.00
24.00 15.00 24.00 38.00
30.00 12.00 30.00 24.00
6.00 12.00 30.00 28.00
15.00 15.00 36.00 30.00
12.00 10.00 24.00 34.00
18.00 20.00 30.00 26.00
4.00 6.00 40.00 28.00
24.00 15.00 30.00 36.00
12.00 12.00 36.00 38.00
12.00 15.00 28.00 34.00
15.00 15.00 42.00 32.00
6.00 12.00 36.00 28.00
18.00 10.00 38.00 30.00
18.00 6.00 32.00 38.00
12.00 15.00 38.00 32.00
18.00 12.00 30.00 34.00
24.00 12.00 36.00 32.00
6.00 6.00 28.00 34.00
18.00 14.00 34.00 28.00
15.00 12.00 38.00 36.00
4.00 12.00 32.00 28.00
APPENDIX III
RECORD OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
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B1 B1 B2 B2
Session I Session II Session I Session II
1.25 2.33 .25 2,00
1.00 1.75 .50 2.50
1.25 1.50 .50 3.00
1.33 1.25 .50 3.50
1.50 2.00 1.00 3.00
1.33 1.25 1.00 4.50
1.25 2.50 1.00 3.50
2.00 1.00 1.25 3.50
1.66 3.50 1.00 2.50
1.50 1.50 1.00 5.00
1.50 3.00 1.25 3.50
1.00 2.00 1.25 4.00
1.00 2.75 2.00 4.50
1.12 3.00 .75 5.00
.66 2.50 2.00 4.50
1.00 2.25 3.50 4.00
1.00 2.50 3.50 5.50
1.50 1.66 1.50 4.50
1.25 1.00 2.50 3.50
1.33 2.50 .50 2.00
1.50 3.00 1.00 4.50
1.25 2.50 1.25 3.00
.66 3.00 2.50 4.00
1.00 2.50 1.50 4.00
1.25 3.00 2.50 5.00
1.00 3.00 1.50 3.00
1.33 2.50 2.00 5.50
1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00
.66 3.00 2.50 2.50
1.25 2.00 2.50 3.50
1.25 5.00 3.00 3.00
1.25 6.50 2.00 3.00
1.00 3.00 2.50 3.50
1.50 2.00 3.50 4.00
1.33 3.00 1.50 3.00
1.25 3.25 1.50 4.00
1.00 3.00 1.50 4.00
1.00 2.00 2.50 4.00
1.00 3.50 3.00 3.50
2.00 5.00 2.50 3.00
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B5 B5 B6 B6
Session I Session II Session I Session II
3.00 3.50 3.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00 12.00
2.00 9.00 5.00 8.00
3.00 12.00 4.00 10.00
5.00 11.00 4.00 6.00
1.00 12.00 3.00 9.00
1.50 8.00 5.00 7.00
2.00 12.00 5.00 7.00
4.00 10.00 6.00 10.00
1.00 9.00 6.00 5.00
1.50 5.00 5.00 6.00
2.50 11.00 4.00 6.00
1.50 12.00 7.00 7.00
2.00 8.00 4.00 7.00
6.00 10.00 6.00 9.00
7.00 13.00 5.00 6.00
6.00 13.00 7.00 7.00
5.00 16.00 5.00 7.00
7.00 15.00 6.00 8.00
7.00 10.00 7.00 8.00
5.00 14.00 4.00 9.00
3.00 15.00 7.00 8.00
8.00 12.00 7.00 8.00
5.00 9.00 4.00 8.00
2.00 13.00 6.00 7.00
7.00 11.00 5.00 8.00
3.00 13.00 5.00 9.00
4.00 9.00 5.00 7.00
5.00 13.00 7.00 9.00
4.50 14.00 7.00 7.00
8.00 13.00 6.00 9.00
10.00 10.00 5.00 8.00
6.00 15.00 5.00 7.00
6.00 9.00 7.00 7.00
4.00 1.00 4.00 8.00
10.00 9.00 6.00 8.00
3.00 14.00 5.00 9.00
3.00 10.00 6.00 7.00
5.00 14.00 4.00 8.00
4.00 13.00 6.00 7.00
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B9 B9 BIO BIO
Session I Session II Session I Session II
24.00 12.00 6.00 18.00
36.00 15.00 12.00 12.00
24.00 15.00 24.00 3.00
12.00 25.00 24.00 6.00
18.00 35.00 18.00 12.00
6.00 15.00 6.00 24.00
6.00 20.00 2.00 24.00
12.00 25.00 18.00 36.00
12.00 20.00 24.00 8.00
18.00 20.00 6.00 12.00
12.00 15.00 12.00 12.00
6.00 35.00 3.00 6.00
6.00 10.00 3.00 24.00
12.00 15.00 12.00 30.00
18.00 25.00 12.00 6.00
12.00 30.00 6.00 12.00
36.00 10.00 6.00 6.00
6.00 30.00 12.00 12.00
12.00 20.00 . 18.00 24.00
12.00 15.00 12.00 18.00
12.00 25.00 12.00 6.00
12.00 30.00 12.00 3.00
16.00 25.00 24.00 36.00
20.00 20.00 12.00 24.00
5.00 25.00 18.00 18.00
12.00 35.00 6.00 24.00
3.00 25.00 3.00 30.00
2.00 35.00 18.00 18.00
6.00 25.00 12.00 36.00
8.00 30.00 18.00 6.00
6.00 35.00 6.00 24.00
12.00 30.00 12.00 18.00
18.00 25.00 24.00 24.00
8.00 25.00 18.00 12.00
12.00 30.00 12.00 24.00
6.00 20.00 3.00 18.00
12.00 30.00 6.00 18.00
24.00 30.00 12.00 12.00
10.00 25.00 6.00 12.00
5.00 30.00 12.00 18.00
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Cl Cl C2 02
Session I Session II Session I Session II
1.00 1.00 1.00 .37
.75 1.50 .25 .75
.25 3.00 .25 .62
.50 2.00 .37 1.25
.50 2.00 .25 1.00
.25 3.00 .37 1.75
.25 2.00 .12 2.00
.25 3.00 .75 2.50
.50 3.00 .50 1.75
.25 3.50 .12 1.62
.50 2.00 .25 2.25
1.00 3.50 .75 2.00
.50 2.50 1.00 1.75
.50 3.25 .87 2.00
.25 2.50 .75 1.37
.25 3.00 1.00 3.50
.50 3.00 .50 3.62
.25 3.25 .75 3.00
1.00 3.00 .62 2.12
.50 3.00 1.25 3.25
1.00 2.00 1.50 2.62
1.00 3.00 1.06 1.75
1.00 3.00 1.00 3.25
1.00 3.00 .87 2.00
.50 3.25 .87 3.00
1.00 3.00 .62 2.75
1.00 2.00 1.25 3.25
.75 3.00 .50 4.00
.50 2.75 .75 1.37
.75 3.50 .62 1.75
1.50 3.00 1.25 2.12
.50 3.50 .50 1.00
1.00 3.00 1.75 2.25
.25 3.25 .62 1.87
.25 3.25 1.25 .75
.25 3.00 .37 3.00
.50 3.00 .50 2.75
1.00 3.75 1.00 3.50
.25 3.25 1.50 2.50
.75 3.00 2.00 3.12
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C3 C3 C4 C4
Session I Session II Session I Session II
.75 1.50 1.00 1.50
.50 2.00 1.00 .50
.50 1.50 1.25 . 25
.7 5 2.00 . 50 1.50
.50 2.00 1.00 2.50
.75 1.75 .50 2.00
1.00 2.50 .25 3.00
1.00 1.50 1.25 4.00
.75 2.00 .50 5.00
.75 2.50 1.00 3.00
.75 2.50 1.25 1.00
1.00 1.50 .50 .50
.50 2.50 .50 2.50
1.00 2.50 1.25 6.50
1.00 1.00 1.25 5.00
.50 2.00 1.50 6.00
1.50 2.75 1.25 4.00
1.00 1.50 2.50 5.00
1.00 2.00 1.00 7.00
1.50 2.00 1.50 5.00
1.50 2.50 1.50 6.00
.25 2.50 2.00 6 . 50
.75 2.00 1.00 3.00
1.50 2.00 1.00 5.00
1.50 1.50 2.00 6.00
.75 2.50 1.00 3.00
.25 1.00 .75 4.00
.75 2.50 .75 5.00
.75 2.00 .25 1.50
1.50 1.50 2.50 4.00
1.00 2.00 1.50 6.00
1.25 2.00 1.50 3.00
.75 2.50 1.50 6.00
1.00 2.00 2.00 5.50
1.50 2.50 1.00 .50
1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
.75 1.00 1.50 1.00
2.00 2.50 2.00 5.00
1.50 2.50 1.50 12.00
1.50 2.50 1.75 .50
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C7 C7 C8 C8
Session I Session II Session I Session II
3.50 2.50 .25 4.00
2.00 4.50 1.25 6.00
4.00 8.00 1.00 12.00
2.00 5.00 1.50 12.00
5.00 4.50 1.50 12.00
3.50 6.00 1.00 15.00
4.50 3.00 1.25 12.00
6.00 6.50 1.00 12.00
2.50 3.50 1.50 15.00
6.50 7.00 2.50 10.00
3.00 6.00 1.50 12.00
2.00 7.50 3.00 12.00
1.50 5.00 2.50 15.00
4.50 9.00 1.50 12.00
2.00 5.00 2.50 12.00
3.50 6.00 3.00 10.00
1.50 6.50 1.00 20.00
3.00 7.00 2.50 15.00
4.00 6.00 2.50 15.00
3.00 6.50 5.00 10.00
2.50 5.00 5.00 12,00
2.50 7.00 5.00 10.00
8.00 9.50 5.00 24.00
9.00 6.50 5.00 20.00
4.50 9.50 8.00 20.00
5.00 5.00 5.00 24.00
3.50 5.50 5.00 25.00
3.00 6.00 4.00 8.00
4.00 7.50 5.00 24.00
7.50 8.00 6.00 12.00
4.00 4.50 10.00 15.00
7.00 . 5.50 8.00 15.00
3.00 7.00 .8.00 24.00
5.00 7.00 10.00 24.00
4.00 10.50 13.00 26.00
5.Ô0 6.50 8.00 10.00
2.00 5:50 15.00 15.00
4.50 7.50 10.00 12.00
3.50 6.00 15.00 15.00
6.00 6.50 10.00 15.00
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C9 C9 CIO CIO
Session I Session II Session I Session II
8.50 5.00 8.00 14.00
8.00 8.00 10.00 16.00
10.00 8.00 12.00 16.00
10.00 10.00 12.00 16.00
12.00 11.00 8.00 16.00
13.00 9.00 12.00 16.00
13.00 12.00 18.00 18.00
14.00 8.00 14.00 18.00
13.00 12.00 18.00 18.00
15.00 12.00 10.00 16.00
12.00 13.00 18.00 18.00
15.00 12.00 12.00 18.00
13.00 14.00 10.00 18.00
13.00 10.00 18.00 16.00
14.00 13.00 14.00 18.00
14.00 12.00 12.00 10.00
12.00 12.00 14.00 14.00
13.00 15.00 10.00 20.00
10.00 15.00 10.00 18.00
14.00 12.00 12.00 18.00
13.00 15.00 10.00 21.00
10.00 13.00 14.00 18.00
11.00 13.00 12.00 16.00
8.00 14.00 14.00 22.00
10.00 13.00 8.00 20.00
11.00 18.00 4.00 24.00
8.00 11.00 8.00 26.00
10.00 12.00 4.00 28.00
9.00 14.00 14.00 24.00
11.00 11.00 14.00 20.00
13.00 7.00 8.00 22.00
9.00 16.00 8.00 16.00
6.00 15.00 12.00 24.00
6.00 13.00 14.00 18.00
8.00 11.00 12.00 20.00
10.00 9.00 10.00 20.00
8.00 14.00 12.00 24.00
9.00 10.00 8.00 24.00
11.00 9.00 10.00 22.00
8.00 12.00 14.00 ■ 24.00
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D1 D1 D2 D2
Session I Session II Session I Session II
1.50 1.00 1.00 1.25
.50 2.00 . 50 6.00
2.00 1.50 .25 1.50
1.00 1.25 3.00 3.00
1.00 1.00 1.25 .62
.50 1.50 5.00 4.00
1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00
.25 .75 4.00 1.00
.12 2.00 1.00 3.00
1.50 1.00 1.50 8.00
.50 1.25 1.50 5.00
2.50 1.00 2.00 9.00
.50 .50 2.00 6.00
.25 1.50 1.00 1.00
.75 .75 1.50 2.00
1.00 2.00 .50 1.00
2.50 1.25 .12 .75
1.00 1.00 .75 4.00
.25 2.00 .50 5.00
.50 1.25 .25 11.00
1.00 1.50 2.50 4.00
1.00 1.75 2.50 7.00
.25 .50 2.50 5.00
1.00 .25 1.50 1.00
1.50 1.00 .25 1.50
.50 .50 .25 1.00
1.00 1.25 .25 2.00
.50 1.50 .25 .25
.25 1.00 .75 2.00
1.00 .75 1.00 3.00
1.25 .75 .12 1.50
2.00 .50 1.00 5.00
1.00 1.00 .50 .75
.75 1.75 1.50 .75
1.50 1.50 1.75 5.00
.25 1.50 1.00 7.00
1.00 1.25 .50 5.00
.12 .75 .75 8.00
1.25 1.25 .50 6.00
.50 2.00 1.00 13.00
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D5 D5 D6 D6
Session I Session II Session I Session II
15.00 12.50 12.00 12.00
13.00 13.00 12.00 14.00
10.00 15.00 11.00 12.00
5.50 17.00 10.00 12.00
9.00 14.50 12.00 12.00
1.50 20.00 11.00 12.00
14.00 13.50 12.00 12.00
9.00 16.00 12,00 12.00
9.00 13.00 13.00 12.00
11.00 18.00 11.00 12.50
8.00 17.50 12.00 12.00
2.00 20.00 12.00 12.00
8.00 17.50 13.00 11.00
12.00 22.00 12.00 13.00
7.00 14.00 13.00 12.00
11.00 19.00 12.00 12.00
15.00 20.00 13.00 12.00
9.50 18.00 11.00 12.00
13.00 14.00 10.00 12.00
11.00 20.00 13.00 16.00
14.00. 17.00 12.00 12.50
7.00 18.00 12.00 12.00
13.00 14.50 11.00 12.50
12.00 15.00 11.00 13.00
10.50 14.00 11.00 13.00
11.50 14.00 11.00 13.00
13.00 16.50 11.00 13.00
10.50 14.00 • 11.00 12.00
13.00 14.00 11.00 16.00
11.00 15.00 11.00 14.00
7.00 14.00 11.00 12.00
14.50 20.00 11.00 13.00
9.50 15.00 11.00 12.00
10.00 15.00 11.00 13.00
14.50 15.00 10.00 12.00
14.00 18.00 11.00 12.00
10.00 14.00 11.00 12.00
12.00 18.00 11.00 12.50
8.00 14.00 11.00 12.00
18.00 14.00 10.00 13.00
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D7 D7 D8 D8
Session I Session II Session I Session II
2.00 3.00 3.00 8.00
4.00 8.00 3.00 12.00
9.00 5.00 4.00 14.00
6.00 12.00 5.00 15.00
5.00 15.00 6.00 12.00
6.00 8.00 6.00 16.00
12.00 6.00 8.00 12.00
24.00 20.00 12.00 13.00
24.00 14.00 8.00 10.00
18.00 24.00 12.00 14.00
18.00 10.00 6.00 10.00
24.00 24.00 12.00 16.00
8.00 10.00 12.00 15.00
12.00 16.00 14.00 15.00
10.00 12.00 12.00 10.00
20.00 9.00 14.00 12.00
8.00 15.00 8.00 13.00
10.00 18.00 12.00 14.00
12.00 6.00 15.00 10.00
12.00 9.00 10.00 13.00
15.00 18.00 12.00 8.00
5.00 17.00 12.00 15.00
13.00 5.00 10.00 13.00
5.00 13.00 14.00 13.00
16.00 24.00 15.00 10.00
24.00 9.00 15.00 8.00
12.00 12.00 13.00 12.00
18.00 14.00 13.00 10.00
15.00 11.00 12.00 12.00
24.00 18.00 13.00 12.00
10.00 17.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 11.00 15.00 13.00
14.00 9.00 12.00 12.00
24.00 9.00 12.00 12.00
9.00 11.00 13.00 8.00
18.00 5.00 14.00 14.00
8.00 10.00 14.00 10.00
5.00 9.00 15.00 12.00
12.00 8.00 12.00 13.00
8.00 4.00 15.00 16.00
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D9 D9 DIO DIO
Session I Session II Session I Session II
8.00 14.00 18.00 12.00
14.00 9.00 24.00 16.00
15.00 14.00 18.00 12.00
14.00 14.00 18.00 18.00
12.00 16.00 24.00 24.00
16.00 20.00 12.00 18.00
20.00 12.00 12.00 18.00
15.00 14.00 12.00 15.00
7.00 12.00 18.00 15.00
17.00 20.00 12.00 18.00
14.00 10.00 12.00 18.00
14.00 21.00 15.00 18.00
22.00 12.00 18.00 18.00
20.00 10.00 18.00 15.00
15.00 20.00 24.00 24.00
18.00 20.00 24.00 12.00
24.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
18.00 11.00 18.00 18.00
20.00 9.00 18.00 15.00
24.00 20.00 20.00 12.00
18.00 10.00 12.00 15.00
16.00 13.00 12.00 10.00
13.00 15.00 12.00 10.00
13.00 21.00 15.00 24.00
16.00 24.00 12.00 12.00
13.00 21.00 18.00 10.00
10.00 11.00 12.00 10.00
16.00 16.00 24.00 18.00
16.00 10.00 18.00 18.00
20.00 11.00 18.00 15.00
16.00 11.00 24.00 15.00
13.00 8.00 18.00 15.00
20.00 16.00 12.00 15.00
13.00 25.00 12.00 12.00
10.00 14.00 18.00 24.00
26.00 21.00 24.00 12.00
20.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
16.00 25.00 8.00 24.00
14.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
21.00 14.00 12.00 12.00
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El El £2 E2
Session 1 Session II Session I Session II
2.00 I.OO 1.000 .500
1.00 1.50 1.062 2.000
.25 1.50 .500 1.000
.12 2.00 1.000 2.500
.12 1.00 . 500 1.500
.25 2.00 1.062 1.250
.25 1.00 1.225 .500
.12 1.50 1.000 1.000
.25 1.00 .625 2.000
.12 .50 .333 1.250
.12 1.50 .187 1.000
.12 .75 .125 .750
.25 1.00 .062 2.000
.25 1.00 .125 .750
.12 .75 .187 .500
.06 1.00 .250 .500
.06 1.50 .312 .750
.06 1.75 .125 1.000
.12 1.00 .187 .750
.25 .75 .250 .500
1.00 .75 .500 1.500
.06 1.50 .750 .750
.12 1.00 .750 1.000
.25 1.50 1.250 1.000
.06 .75 .500 1.250
.06 .75 .062 .750
.12 .50 .087 .750
.50 .50 .500 1.000
.12 .75 .062 1.000
.06 2.00 .187 .500
.06 1.00 .125 .750
.06 2.00 .062 .500
.12 1.00 .062 .250
.12 2.00 .062 .250
.50 .50 .062 1.000
.12 .50 .125 .500
.50 1.00 .250 1.000
.12 1.00 .500 .250
.06 .50 .187 .750
.25 .75 .125 .250
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E3 E3 E4 E4
Session I Session II Session I Session II
.50 1.00 2.00 1.00
.50 .25 2.00 3.00
1.00 .50 1.00 2.00
.25 1.00 2.00 2.00
1.00 1.25 3.00 2.00
.25 .50 2.00 3.00
.25 .50 2.00 2.00
.25 .25 1.00 3.00
.50 1.00 1.00 3.00
.25 1.00 2.00 3.00
.25 .25 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
.50 1.25 2.00 3.00
1.00 .25 1.00 3.00
.25 .75 2.00 3.00
1.25 1.25 1.00 2.00
.50 1.00 2.00 3.00
1.00 .25 1.00 3.00
1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
1.00 .25 1.00 3.00
.50 .75 2.00 2.00
.25 1.50 1.00 3.00
.50 .75 1.00 3.00
1.00 .50 2.00 3.00
.25 .25 3.00 3.00
1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
.25 1.25 2.00 2.00
1.50 .25 3.00 2.00
.25 1.00 2.00 3.00
.50 1.00 1.00 3.00
.25 1.00 2.00 3.00
.50 .75 1.00 3.00
1.00 .75 1.00 2.50
1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00
1.00 .25 2.00 3.00
1.00 .50 1.00 3.50
.50 .50 1.00 2.00
.25 1.00 1.00 3.00
.50 .50 1.00 3.00
1.00 .50 1.00 3.00
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E5 E5 E6 E6
Session I Session II Session I Session II
3.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
3.00 2.00 5.00 5.00
2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00
1.00 4.00 3.00 8.00
3.00 3.00 8.00 7.00
2.00 4.00 3.00 6.00
2.00 3.00 6.00 4.00
3.00 3.00 10.00 5.00
4.00 4.00 12.00 5.00
2.00 3.00 3.00 5.00
4.00 4.00 3.00 8.00
2.00 4.00 6.00 5.00
2.00 2.00 3.00 6.00
1.00 3.00 2.00 8.00
3.00 3.00 7.00 6.00
1.00 3.00 12.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 3.00 6.00 6.00
1.00 2.00 5.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00
2.00 4.00 6.00 6.00
1.00 3.00 6.00 12.00
2.00 2.00 12.00 6.00
3.00 3.00 3.00 14.00
1.00 3.00 12.00 4.00
4.00 2.00 7.00 4.00
2.00 3.00 5.00 14.00
2.00 2.00 7.00 6.00
1.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 8.00
1.00 ■ 3.00 3.00 6.00
2.00 3.00 12.00 4.00
2.00 2.00 6.00 12.00
1.00 ■ 2.00 8.00 5.00
2.00 3.00 14.00 6.00
1.00 3.00 12.00 12.00
2.00 3.00 10.00 3.00
2.00 2.00 5.00 6.00
3.00 2.00 6.00 6.00
1.00 2.00 6.00 8.00
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E7 E7 E8 E8
Session I Session II Session I Session II
10 .00 6 .0 0 4 .0 0 8 .00
1 0 .00 10 .00 5 .00 10.00
6 .0 0 6 .0 0 5 .00 12 .00
7.00 8.00 8.00 12.00
6 .0 0 6 .0 0 1 0 .00 10 .00
6 .0 0 12 .00 10 .00 12 .00
8 .00 6 .00 10 .00 10 .00
6 .0 0 6 .0 0 12 .00 12.00
6 .0 0 6 .0 0 12.00 10.00
6.00 5.00 12.00 12.00
8.00 8.00 10.00 11.00
6.00 12.00 12.00 13.00
8.00 10.00 12.00 10.00
6.00 8.00 12.00 12.00
6.00 10.00 10.00 11.00
6.00 10.00 12.00 13.00
4.00 6.00 12.00 13.00
7.00 8.00 12.00 14.00
6.00 8.00 12.00 12.00
4.00 12.00 10.00 13.00
4.00 6.00 12.00 12.00
6.00 13.00 10.00 13.00
8.00 6.00 12.00 11.00
8.00 6.00 12.00 10.00
6.00 6.00 10.00 11.00
8.00 6.00 10.00 12.00
8.00 6.00 10.00 10.00
6.00 10.00 8.00 12.00
8.00 4.00 10.00 10.00
8.00 6.00 10.00 12.00
8.00 6.00 12.00 11.00
6.00 8.00 10.00 10.00
6.00 6.00 8.00 11.00
6.00 6.00 10.00 10.00
6.00 7.00 12.00 12.00
10.00 6.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 6.00 10.00 11.00
10.00 7.00 12.00 12.00
8.00 8.00 8.00 12.00
6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00
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E9 E9 ElO ElO
Session I Session II Session I Session II
12.00 10.00 4.50 12.00
18.00 8.00 12.00 18.50
12.00 5.00 16.75 17.00
20.00 4.00 11.50 22.50
30.00 3.50 18.00 19.50
26.00 4.00 24.00 23.50
20.00 4.00 21.00 22.00
14.00 4.00 18.00 26.00
26.00 4.25 18.00 21.00
30.00 4.00 15.50 27.00
16.00 4.50 19.00 18.00
12.00 5.00 18.00 19.00
10.00 4.50 14.00 18.00
12.00 5.00 16.50 23.00
10.00 6.00 14.50 16.00
10.00 5.50 17.00 18.00
8.on 6.00 15.00 18.00
14.00 4.00 15.00 19.00
15.00 3.50 11.50 17.00
18.00 4.00 13.00 18.00
8.00 4.00 12.50 22.00
16.00 3.50 16.00 21.00
10.00 3.50 16.00 20.00
12.00 3.50 14.00 19.00
12.00 3.00 17.00 18.00
14.00 4.00 18.00 19.00
10.00 2.50 14.00 26.00
16.00 3.00 13.00 16.00
11.00 5.00 14.50 19.00
10.00 5.00 14.00 21.00
8.00 3.50 17.00 14.00
10.00 4.00 12.00 19.00
10.00 4.00 13.00 16.00
8.00 4.00 11.00 16.00
12.00 4.00 11.00 17.00
10.00 3.50 12.00 17.00
8.00 3.50 14.00 17.00
12.00 4.00 15.00 18.00
12.00 3.00 13.00 19.00
8.00 3.50 16.00 19.00
